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I.

INTRODUCTION

Cyber-crime, once the domain of disaffected genius teenagers as
portrayed in the movies "War Games" and "Hackers," has grown into
a mature and sophisticated threat to the open nature of the Internet.
"Cyber-criminals," like their non-virtual traditional criminal
counterparts, seek opportunity and are attracted to vacuums in law
enforcement. The news media is filled with reports of debilitating
denial of service attacks, defaced web sites, and new computer viruses
worming their way through the nation's computers. However, there
are countless other cyber-crimes that are not made public due to
private industry's reluctance to publicize its vulnerability and the
government's concern for security.'
Along with the phenomenal growth of the Internet has come the
growth of cyber-crime opportunities. 2 As a result of rapid adoption of
I. Michael Hatcher et al., ComputerCrimes, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 397, 399 (1999).
2. See Michael Lee et al., Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for
Legitimacy:A Regulatory Proposal,14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 839 (1999). In a recent survey of
643 computer security practitioners in the U.S., "[s]eventy percent reported a variety of serious
computer security breaches other than the most common ones of computer viruses, laptop theft
or employee 'net abuse' -- for example, theft of proprietary information, financial fraud, system
penetration from outsiders, denial of service attacks and sabotage of data or networks."
Computer Security Insititute, Ninety percent of survey respondents detect cyber attacks, 273
organizations report $265,589,940
in financial losses
(Mar.
22,
2000)
<http://www.goesi.com/prelea_000321.htm> [hereinafter CSI Survey]. The report also found
that:
Ninety percent of respondents (primarily large corporations and government
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the Internet globally, computer crimes include not only hacking and
cracking, but now also include extortion, child pornography, money
laundering, fraud, software pirating, and corporate espionage, to name
a few. 3 Law enforcement officials have been frustrated by the
inability of legislators to keep cyber-crime legislation ahead of the
fast-moving technological curve.4 At the same time, legislators face
the need to balance the competing interests between individual rights,
to protect the integrity
such as privacy and free speech, and the need
5
networks.
private
and
of the world's public
Further complicating cyber-crime enforcement is the area of
legal jurisdiction. 6 Like pollution control legislation, one country can
not by itself effectively enact laws that comprehensively address the
problem of Internet crimes without cooperation from other nations.
While the major international organizations, like the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G-8, are
seriously discussing cooperative schemes, many countries do not
share the urgency to combat cyber-crime for many reasons, including
different values concerning piracy and espionage or the need to
These countries,
address more pressing social problems.
inadvertently or not, present the cyber-criminal with a safe haven to
operate. Never before has it been so easy to commit a crime in one
jurisdiction while hiding behind the jurisdiction of another.
In section II of this article, we begin by providing an overview of
cyber-crimes, the state of the law, and cyber-crime perpetrators and
their motivations. Then, in section III we discuss in detail three major
computer crimes and analyze how the different statutory subsections
are applied depending upon the technical details of the crime itself.
Just as a murder prosecution is dependent on how the crime was
committed, different hacking techniques trigger different federal antiagencies) detected computer security breaches within the last twelve months...
[sleventy-four percent acknowledged financial losses due to computer
breaches ... [and] [f]orty-two percent were willing and/or able to quantify their
financial losses. The losses from these 273 respondents totaled $265,589,940
(the average annual total over the last three years was $120,240,180).
Id.
3. See Federal Law Enforcement Response to Internet Hacking: Hearing of the
Commerce, Justice, State and JudiciarySubcomm. of the Senate AppropriationsComm., 106th
Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Federal Response to Hacking] (statement of Louis Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
4. See id.
5. There is concern that the effort to fill the legal vacuum will include some protected
rights, as was demonstrated by the Supreme Court's holding in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
6. See Lee et al., supranote 2, at 873.
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computer crime subsections. We begin with a discussion of the
various denial of service attacks and the applicable statutes. Next we
discuss the technical details of several hacking techniques and apply
the relevant statutory subsections to the specific techniques. Finally,
we explore the various types of computer viruses and how viral
"payloads" and the class of the targeted computer will determine
which federal subsection can be applied to the crime. In section IV,
we discuss proposed legislative changes to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and related privacy concerns. Finally, we conclude this
paper with a brief statement on the importance of tying together the
technical elements of a cyber-crime and the application of the
appropriate criminal subsection.
UI. BACKGROUND

What is a cyber-crime? Law enforcement experts and legal
commentators are divided. Some experts believe that computer crime
is nothing more than ordinary crime committed by high-tech
computers and that current criminal laws on the books should be
applied to the various laws broken, such as trespass, larceny, and
conspiracy. Others view cyber-crime as a new category of crime
requiring a comprehensive new legal framework to address the unique
nature of the emerging technologies and the unique set of challenges
that traditional crimes do not deal with; such as jurisdiction,
international cooperation, 7 intent, and the difficulty of identifying the
perpetrator. Another source of confusion is the meaning of "hacker"
and "cracker" and the distinction behind their motivations. The
following section will elaborate on the differences between the two
and their relevance to federal criminal statutes.
A. The State of the Law
Congress has approached computer crime both as traditional
crime committed by new methods and as crime unique in character
requiring new legal framework. For example, Congress has amended
the Securities Act of 19338 to include crimes committed by a
computer. However, Congress has also enacted a comprehensive new
computer fraud and abuse section that can easily be amended to
reflect changes in technology and computer use by criminals. In fact,
the U.S. Congress has enacted statutes that widen the scope of
7. Michael A. Sussmann, The CriticalChallenges From the InternationalHigh-Tech and
Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 DUKEJ. CoMP. & INT'LL. 451,453-55 (1999).

8. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1994).
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traditional crimes to specifically include crimes involving computers,
or categorize them as entirely separate offenses. For example, the
main federal statutory framework for many computer crimes is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).9 The statute is structured
with an eye to the future so that it can be easily amended to reflect
changes in technology and criminal techniques. The statute has
already been amended several times to close unintended loopholes
created by judicial interpretation. In its current form, the statute is
very broad in scope, reflecting the government's resolve to combat
cyber-crime at every level.
B. The Perpetrators-Hackersand Crackers
1. Hackers
"Hacker"' 0 is a term commonly applied to a "computer user who

intends to gain unauthorized access to a computer system."" Hackers
are skilled computer users who penetrate computer systems to gain
knowledge about computer systems and how they work.' 2 The
traditional hacker does not have authorized access to the system."
Hacking purists do not condone damage to the systems that are
hacked.' 4 According to The Jargon Dictionary, the term "hacker"
seems to have been first adopted as a badge in the 1960s by the
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1999).
10. The term "hacker" has been defined as "[a] computer enthusiast who enjoys learning
everything about a computer system or network and through clever programming, pushing the
system to its highest possible level of performance." WEBsTER'S NEW WORD DICTIONARY OF
COMPUTER TERMs 235 (7th ed. 1999). See Appendix A for a more detailed definition.
11. Michael P. Dierks, Symposium: Electronic Communications and Legal Change,
ComputerNetworkAbuse, 6 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 307, 310 n.7 (1993).
12. According to Deb Price and Steve Schmadeke, the "Hackers credo" is:
1. Access to computers should be unlimited and total.
2. All information should be free.
3. Mistrust authority-promote decentralization.
4. Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as
degrees, age, race or position.
5. You can create art and beauty on a computer.
6. Computers can change your life for the better.
Deb Price & Steve Schmadeke, Hackers Expose Web Weakness. There's No Defense Against
InternetAssaults,Experts Confess, and Attackers are Elusive, DET. NEWS, Feb. 14, 2000, at Al,
availablein 2000 WL 3467302.
13. However, this is not a legal distinction. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
criminalizes unauthorized access and access that exceeds authorization. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1030(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
14. See
Dissident,
Ethics
of
Hacking
(visited
Mar.
3,
2000)
<http:llcultdeadbunnies.virtualave.net/hackingllitlfileslethics.txt>.
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hacker culture surrounding The Tech Model Railroad Club (TMRC)
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology when members of the group
began to work with computers. 5 The TMRC resents the application
of the term "hacker" to mean the committing of illegal acts,

maintaining that words such as "thieves," "password crackers," or
"computer vandals" are better descriptions. 6

In the hacking "community," it is considered better to be
described as a "hacker" by others than to describe oneself as a
"hacker."' 7 Hackers consider themselves members of an elite
meritocracy based on ability and trade hacker techniques and "war
stories" amongst themselves in Usenet forums, local or regional
clubs, and national conferences, such as the annual Def Con
Computer Underground Convention held in Las Vegas. i8

2. Crackers
A "cracker" is a hacker with criminal intent. 9 According to The
Jargon Dictionary, 20 the term began to appear in 1985 as a way to
distinguish "benign" hackers from hackers who maliciously cause
damage to targeted computers. Crackers 21 maliciously sabotage
computers, steal information located on secure computers, and cause
disruption to the networks for personal or political motives. 22

Estimates made in the mid-1990's by Bruce Sterling, author of
The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic

Frontier,put "the total number of hackers at about 100,000, of which
15. See
The
Jargon
Dictionary
(visited
Mar.
9,
2000)
<http://www.netmeg.net/jargon/terms/h.html#hacker>.
16. See generally STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 10
(1984).
17. See Appendix A.
18. DEF CON is an annual computer underground party and conference for hackers held
every summer in Las Vegas, Nevada.
See DEF CON (visited Apr. 5, 2000)
<http://www.defcon.org>.
19. The
Jargon
Dictionary
(visited
Mar.
9,
2000)
<http://www.netmeg.netljargonlterms/c/Cracker.html>.
20. See Appendix A.
21. Please note that a "cracker" is different from a "crack." A crack is a script that defeats
software protection codes, as opposed to using a circulated password that allows installation of
the software. As software protection techniques become more sophisticated, the use of "cracks"
have gained in popularity, as well as the challenge amongst crackers to defeat the protections.
Most popular software passwords and/or cracks are widely available on the Internet. For
example, one can quickly find software cracks by running a search on Astalavista (visited Mar.
9, 2000) <http://astalavista3.box.sk/>.
22. This distinction does not mean that hackers do not cause damage, but often it is their
lack of intent that sets them apart from crackers, even though federal law does not always make
such a distinction. See discussion infra on 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1999).
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10,000 are dedicated and obsessed computer enthusiasts. A group of
to
250-1,000 are in the so-called hacker 'elite', skilled enough
23
security.
corporate
unnerve
to
and
penetrate corporate systems
In the eyes of the law, hacking and cracking are not always
treated the same way. Depending upon the method of intrusion, the
type of computer that was broken into, the hacker's intent, and the
type and amount of damage, different statutes and penalties will
apply. 24 There are many ways to approach a discussion on hacking.
In this article, we will structure the discussion on hacking techniques
within the framework of the statutory elements to provide an
understanding of how the different techniques trigger different
statutes and penalties. We begin with an overview of hacking and an
explanation of several common hacking techniques. Then, we discuss
the relevant criminal code that can be applied depending on the nature
of the hack.
C. Why People Hack
1. Hactivism
In recent years, according to the Department of Justice's
National Infrastructure Protection Center, there has been a rise in
what has been dubbed "hacktivism." Hacktivists launch politically
motivated attacks on public web pages or e-mail servers. The hacking
groups and individuals, or Hacktivists, overload e-mail servers by
sending massive amounts of e-mail to one address and hack into web
sites to send a political message.25 In 1999, for example, the
homepages for the White House, the U.S. Department of the Interior,
White Pride, the United States Senate, Greenpeace, and the Ku Klux
Klan were attacked by political activists protesting the sites' politics.26
23. CyberterrorismHype, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Dec. 1, 1999, at 48, 49, available
in 1999 WL 8946130.
However, to launch a sophisticated attack against a hardened target requires three
to four years of practice in C, C++, Perl and Java (computer languages), general
UNIX and NT systems administration (types of computer platform), LAN/WAN
theory, remote access and common security protocols (network skills) and a lot
of free time. On top of these technical nuts and bolts, there are certain skills that
must be acquired within the cracker community.
Id.
24. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c) (West Supp. 1999).
25. See Senate Joint Cyberattack Investigation: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, 106e
Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Cyberattack Investigation] (statement of Michael Vatis, Director,
National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
26. See FlashbackSweden (visited Mar. 12,2000) <http:llwww.flashback.se/hack/1999/>.
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One such group is called the "Electronic Disturbance Theater," which

promotes civil disobedience on-line to raise awareness for its political
agenda regarding the Zapatista movement in Mexico and other
issues.27 Also, during the 1999 NATO conflict in Yugoslavia, hackers
attacked web sites in NATO countries, including the United States,

using virus-infected e-mail and other hacking techniques. 2

On

February 7, 2000, the official web site of the Austrian Freedom Party

was hacked to protest the inclusion of Jiirg Haider and his party into a
29
coalition Austrian government.

2. Employees
According to a study conducted in 1999 by Michael G. Kessler
& Associates Ltd., disgruntled employees are the greatest threat to a

computer's security.30 Employees that steal confidential information
and trade secrets account for thirty-five percent of the theft of
proprietary information. 3' In fact, data suggests that serious economic
losses linked to computer abuse have been and continue to be
attributed to current and former employees of the victimized
organization rather than to outside hackers with modems. 32 Internet

Security Systems' Chris Klaus estimates that over eighty percent of

33
the attacks on computer systems are committed by employees.
According to recent FBI assessments, disgruntled insiders are a

principal source of computer crimes. 34 Insiders do not need a great
deal of knowledge about their target computers, because their inside
knowledge of the victim's system allows them unrestricted access to

27. See FederalResponse to Hacking, supra note 3.
28. See id.
29. To view a copy of the hacked web site, see (visited Apr. 9, 2000)
<http:llwww.flashback.sehack/2000/02/0711>.
30. See David Noack, Employees, Not Hackers, Greatest Computer Threat (Jan. 4, 2000)
<http: www.apbnews.com/newscenter/internetcrime/2000/01/04/Comptheftol04-_Ol.htmnl>.
31. Seeid.
32. See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalizaton:The
Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 116 (1988).
33. Matthew Nelson, Internet Security Systems' Chris Klaus says companiesshould close
back doors to be secure, INFOWORLD, Jan. 10, 2000, at 40a. According to a recent survey of
643 computer security practitioners in the U.S., 71% reported unauthorized access by insiders.
See CSI Survey, supra note 2.
34. See Congressional Statement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC) Cyber Threat Assessment, October 1999, Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 6, 1999)
<http:/lwww.y2kcoming.comlyber/nipclO-99.htm> (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Director,
National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
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cause damage to the system or to steal system data.35 A Computer
Security Institute/FBI report notes that fifty-five percent of survey
respondents reported malicious activity by insiders. 36 Employees who
exceed their authorized use and intentionally cause damage are just as
37
liable as an outside hacker who intentionally causes damage.
However, § 1030(a)(5) of the CFAA does not criminalize damage
caused by authorized persons and company insiders that was reckless
or negligent." Only outside non-authorized hackers are liable for any
39
damage caused, whether it was negligent, reckless, or intentional.
3. Recreational Hackers
"Recreational hackers" break into computer networks for the
thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacking
community. 40 While hacking once required a fair amount of skill or
computer knowledge, the recreational hacker today can now
download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and launch
them against victim sites with little knowledge of the systems they are
attacking 4' There are countless web sites on the Internet that provide
"newbies" (inexperienced hackers, or "wannabes") with detailed
instructions on hacking techniques and downloadable, do-it-yourself
hacking tools. 42 In recent years, the hacker's attack tools have
become more sophisticated and easier to use.43 For example, in 1999
hackers defaced the Anniston Army Depot, Lloyd's of London, the
U.S. Senate and Yahoo home pages to demonstrate to the hacking
community their ability to hack into third-party servers and to
highlight the servers' vulnerabilities.

35. See id.
36. See id.
37. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1999).
38. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
39. See id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
40. See CyberattackInvestigation, supranote 25.
41. See Internet Security Systems, Back Orifice 2000 Backdoor Program(visited Apr. 5,
2000) <http://www.iss.netlcustomer-care/resource_center/whitepapers>
[hereinafter Back
Orifice].
42. Hackers learn hacking techniques from a variety of sources, including high school and
university
computer
groups;
newsgroups
such
as
alt.2600.hackerz
and
alt.binaries.hacking.beginners; hacking web sites such as <http://www.flashback.se> and
<http://www.lopht.com/>;
as
well
as
hacking
search
engines,
such
as
<http://astalavista.box.skl>.
43. See Cyber Threat Assessment, supra note 34.
44. See FlashbackSweden, supranote 26.
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4. Web Site Administrators and Web Pages

It is usually considered a passive and harmless exercise to visit a
web site. The user requests information and the server responds to
the request by sending out packets of requested data back to the user's
computer. However, web sites can also access a lot of hidden
background information from the user. For example, Privacy.net has
a web site that will show users all of the information that can be taken
from their individual computer. 45 The remote web site can determine
the following information about a visitor:
(a) the IP address the user is accessing the web site from;
(b) the number of prior visits to the web site, and the dates;
(c) the URL of the page that contained the link to get the user to
the web site;
(d) the user's browser type and operating system and version;
(e) the user's screen resolution;
(f) whether JavaScript and VBScript are enabled on the user's
computer;
(g) how many web pages the user has visited in the current session;
(h)
the local time and date; and
(i) FrP username and password, if there is one.

46

Privacy advocates have pressured web browser developers to
address security concerns by enabling users to significantly enhance
their privacy by adjusting the security level on their browsers. The
extent of information that a web site can retrieve from a visitor
without violating the CFAA is still uncertain. Section 1030(a)(2)(C)
proscribes the intentional access of computer information. When a
person visits a web site, how much information has that person
reasonably "authorized" the web site to obtain? This question may be
answered by a court in one of the cases filed against RealNetworks
over its gathering of user data.47
45. Privacy.net: The Consumer Information Organization (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http:llprivacy.net/analyze/>.
46. Id.
47. In November, 1999, it was alleged that "RealNetworks' popular RealJukebox
software... surreptitiously monitors the listening habits and certain other activities of people
who use it and continually reports this information, along with the user's identity, to
RealNetworks." Sara Robinson, CD Software Is Said to Monitor Users' Listening Habits, N.Y.
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It is also possible for a web programmer to enable a web page to
send an e-mail to a predetermined address just by visiting the page
through a JavaScript exploit in Netscape Navigator Versions 2.0
through 4.Obl. 48 For example, if a person visits such a web site,
hidden within the hypertext markup language (HTML) is code that
will cause the person's e-mail program to send an e-mail to the web
site with the person's e-mail address in the "from' slot.
Theoretically, this exploit would allow a web site to collect all of the
e-mails from persons who visit their web site. Internet Explorer and
Netscape Navigator provide security warnings to users before they
send the mail if the security level is set at a higher level.4 9
111. TYPES OF COMPUTER CRIME
In this section, we begin by providing an overview of cybercrime and criminal techniques used to penetrate protected computer
networks, including: (1) Denial of Service attacks; (2) web site
defacing and malicious interference; and (3) malicious code-viruses,
worms, and Trojans. We then discuss in detail the CFAA, how it is
applied, and how it has changed over the past decade. We also look at
other laws that the federal government uses to control computer
crimes.
A computer can be the target of the offense, the tool used in the
offense, or may contain evidence of the offense.50 An understanding
of the different uses of a computer will provide the foundation of the
application of the criminal statutes.
The computer is an indispensable tool for almost all cyberTMEs, Nov. 1, 1999 at Cl. A security expert discovered that RealNetworks was using its
RealJukebox player to secretly scan the hard drives of computers and send the information about
the user's musical content and preferences to the company. The software also created a serial
number to identify the user. See id. As a result, three class-action lawsuits were filed against
RealNetworks. Two federal lawsuits, filed in Pennsylvania and Illinois, alleged that the
company violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by secretly collecting personal
information without the user's consent. The lawsuits claim that this is a violation of federal law
because RealNetworks accesses information on a protected computer without the knowledge of
the user. See Greg Miller, RealNetworks BreachedPrivacy,3 Suits Contend Consumers: Firm
Admitted Collecting Dataon Users of its Internet Sofnvare, Provoking the First ClassActions in
Such a Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at Cl.
48. See DigiCrime E-mail Address Demonstration (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http://www.digicrime.com/noprivacy.html>; see also Onion Routing (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http://www.onion-router.net/Tests.html> (listing other good privacy testing sites).
49. For example, Microsoft Internet Explorer provides four levels of security on its web
browser, ranging from low to high. The various levels of security allow the user to make a
tradeoff between unimpeded access to all Internet content and security concerns.
50. See Hatcher et al., supra note 1, at 401.
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crimes. However, as more devices are enabled to communicate with
the Internet, the hackers arsenal of tools is likely to multiply.51
When a computer is the target of the offense, the criminal's goal
is to steal information from, or cause damage to, a computer,
computer system, or computer network. 52 Hacking, cracking,
espionage, cyber-warfare, and malicious computer code viruses are
common forms of crimes that target the computer. The perpetrators
range from teenage "cyber-joyriders" to organized crime operations
and international terrorists. According to a survey conducted by
Michael G. Kessler & Associates Ltd., a New York security firm,
computer theft of proprietary information is committed by
discontented employees (35%), outside hackers (28%), other U.S.
companies (18%), foreign corporations (11%), foreign governments
53
(8%), and miscellaneous (10%).
The computer may also be a tool of the offense. The criminal
uses the computer to commit a traditional crime, such as
counterfeiting. For example, a counterfeiter that used to engrave
plates to create the counterfeit currency can now use sophisticated
graphic computers with advanced color printers. An example of a
computer used to perpetrate a traditional crime is the extortion
attempt by George Matos Rocha from North Carolina. 54 Mr. Rocha
was charged with bombing three home improvement stores and
subsequently threatened the retail chain to continue the bombings
unless he received $250,000.15 Using the Internet, Mr. Rocha set up a
bank account in Latvia and instructed the company to wire the
extortion money to his Latvian account.56 The FBI was able to
identify the account and trace its origin back to the United States with
the help of his Internet Service Provider. Mr. Rocha pleaded guilty in

51. LOpht Heavy Industries is developing a hacking platform based on the PalmPilot,
mainly because of its high-mobility and the ability to communicate with desktop computers.
L0pht already offers several applications for PalmPilots that demonstrate its potential as the next
hacker's development platform.
The ability to communicate using wireless infrared
communication, the small size and the support for TCP/IP makes PalmPilot almost ideal for
physical penetration to a local network. See LOPHT Heavy Industries (visited Mar. 19, 2000)
<http://wwv.lopht.com>; see also Phil Askey, How to Connect Your PalmPilotto Windows NT,
Jagtech (1997) <http://www.jagtech.com.au/Docs/pilot..nt.htn> (copy on file with the author).
52, See id.
53. See Noack, supra note 30.
54. See Paula Christian, Lowe's Bombing Suspect Pleads Guilty; A GreensboroMan Will
Face at Least 37 Years in Prison When He is Sentenced in March, GREENSBORO NEWS AND
REc., Dec. 7, 1999, at Al, availablein 1999 WL 26311607.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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December to explosives charges and extortion. He could have faced
57
life in prison.
Computers can also be incidental to the offense, but are
nevertheless important because they contain the evidence of a crime.
Money launderers, for example, may use a computer to store details
of their laundering operation instead of relying on paper accounting
records. Child pornographers' computers are often seized as the key
evidence58 that the defendant produced, possessed, received, and/or
59
distributed child pornography.
A. Denial of Service

A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a rather primitive technique
that overwhelms the resources of the target computer which results in
the denial of server access to other computers. There are several
different techniques that hackers use to "bring down" a server. As the
network administrators learn how to limit the damage of one
technique, hackers often create more powerful and more sophisticated
techniques that force system administrators to continually react
against assaults. In order to understand how to apply the law to these
attacks, a basic understanding of the anatomy of the attacks is
57. See 40 Years Meted in Lowe Bombings, in Henry Bailey, U.S. & WORLD NEWS IN
BIEF, COM. APPEAL (Memphis TN), Mar. 10, 2000, at A5,available in 2000 WL 4444494.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1999). James Snyder was
convicted of producing, receiving, and distributing child pornography, as well as possessing
child pornography with intent to sell. Mr. Snyder engaged in a sexual affair with a minor child.
After the minor was interviewed by the FBI and was able to describe the abuse and identify Mr.
Snyder's house, a search warrant was obtained and served on Mr. Snyder. The computer-related
evidence seized from Snyder's house was "analyzed by the FBI crime lab ...[and] verified that
Snyder's computer was capable of downloading and uploading images from the Internet, and
that it could be hooked up to a camera. [The FBI] also recovered several pornographic images
from the computer, even though they had been deleted." Id. at 644.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Va. 1998). Mark Simons
was an employee of the Foreign Bureau of Information Services (FBIS) component of the CIA.
While a FBIS network administrator was doing a routine check of the agency's firewall, he
noticed a lot of activity from one work station going to a pornographic site, against established
agency rules. The computer was seized as evidence and Mr. Simons was charged with violating
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (1994), Receiving Materials Containing Child Pornography, and 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), Possession of Material Containing Child Pornography. Mr. Simons
unsuccessfully challenged the seizure on grounds that the search was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The court held that, in applying the holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), the court must consider "whether the employee searched had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. The person must have had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and the
expectation must have been one that society recognizes as reasonable." United States v. Simons,
29 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27. The FBIS has a specific policy providing for computer audits and
given this policy, the court concluded that Mr. Simons did not have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to any Internet use." Id. at 327.
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necessary.
There are basically three main network exploits that are used to
overwhelm a system's server: SYN Flood Attacks, UDP Flood
Attacks and ICMP Flood Attacks. Each technique exploits a
weakness in the way computers communicate amongst each other
over the Internet. A basic understanding of the TCP/IP Internet
protocols is helpful to differentiate between the techniques.
Internet Protocols:
The Internet is a network of computers that are connected so
they can exchange information amongst each other. The computer
that is asking for information from another computer is the "client"
and the computer that is receiving the request is the "server." When
the client wants to receive information that is located on the server, it
sends a request for the information. However, the computers must
establish a connection before data can be exchanged. The server
needs to know who it is going to send the information to and needs to
make sure the client computer is ready to receive the information.
This is considered a "3-way handshake." The first part of the
handshake occurs when the client computer sends a message to the
server with a "SYN flag" that tells the server how to identify it.61
Second, upon receiving the request, the server will send out its own
identification number, called an Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in a
SYN for this request and an acknowledgement (ACK) of the client's
request. In the third part of this "handshake," the client computer
receives the SYN and ACK from the server and sends back the ACK
with the server's numbers, like a secret code the two of them share so
the server can keep track of multiple clients. Now the data transfer
can take place. In summary, the client sends a message to the server,
the server sends back a message to the client that the server is
"awake" and ready to process the requests, then the client sends back
an acknowledgement that it is ready to receive. This may seem
redundant, but the need to establish the connection on both sides is

60. Many commentators equate a DoS to a store front being blocked by hundreds of
protestors to deny legitimate customers from entering the store. A more accurate analogy would
be sending a hundred people into a store who overwhelm the sales staff, rendering them unable
to respond to legitimate customers. Eventually, the store becomes so crowded that a line forms
outside, where the "bogus" customers and real customers queue up, denying access to legitimate
customers.
61. A "SYN" packet is an abbreviation for "synchronized/start." The SYN packet is the
packet that originates with the "source host," or the person initiating the communication. The
SYN packet is part of the TCP "3-way handshake."
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very important, because the data is broken up into small packets by
the server and sent out over the Internet to the client. The client needs
to know how to organize the data puzzle as the packets arrive and the
client also needs to know if any packets are missing. As each piece of
the puzzle arrives, the client lets the server know the piece has been
received, so the server knows if it has to re-send it.
TCP/IP stands for Transmission Control Protocol and Internet
Protocol. 2 Basically, the TCP is the workhorse of the communication
on both sides. If a file is requested by the client, the server locates the
file on its computer and breaks the file into tiny pieces. The tiny
pieces are called datagrams. Each datagram is "wrapped" in a bundle
of instructions that tells it where to go. These little bundles are called
"packets." The TCP assigns a sequence number to every byte
transferred so it can track what it has sent and eliminate the need to
duplicate sending the same packet twice unless the packet is lost
somewhere along the line to the client. The "packet header," contains
the sequence numbers that also tells the client the next sequence
number to expect after each packet, so the client can start arranging
the packets and conduct a rolling inventory. The TCP acts as a digital
shipping and receiving department.
The job of the Internet Protocol (IP) is easier. The IP's job is to
route the packets across the Internet to the client. Each computer on
the Internet has an IP address that tells the computers where the other
is located. The IP address is very similar to a zip code. For example,
a zip code that begins with a 9, belongs to an address located on the
west coast of the United States. If the next number is a 4, the location
is in the San Francisco area, and so on until the precise region is
located. However, to parallel the IP addresses, each house in the zip
code area would be assigned a number, instead of an address. So
when a client or server sends a packet out over the Internet, the packet
is "routed" through many other servers to reach its final destination.
The IP tacks on the numerical address and ships it out, hoping the
packet arrives where it is supposed to go. If the server does not
receive a response that the packet was received on the other end, the
IP can send an error message to the client, called an Internet Control
Message Protocol, or ICMP, letting the client know that the packet
did not get there. It is this system of trust and cooperation between
the computers that is exploited by a denial of service attack.

62.

See Appendix A.
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1. SYN Flood Attacks

One of the weaknesses in the system is the amount of SYN
requests the TCP can handle. When the TCP receives more requests
than it is programmed to handle, it puts the other incoming SYN
requests in a queue. When the queue is filled to capacity, there is no
more room to put the other incoming SYN requests and they are
turned back. Hence, they are "denied service."
Another technique is to slow down the TCP process by making
the TCP wait for all of the ACKs it sent out to be acknowledged by
the client. When the attacker sends a message to the server requesting
data, the server sends out a SYN and an ACK and waits to hear back
from the attacker's client, as part of the third part of the 3-way
handshaking. However, the attacker has "spoofed" his return address
so that the server sends a "self-addressed and stamped" envelope to
an address that is either false or belongs to a computer that is not
responding. If enough of these "spoofed" SYN messages are sent, the
server is paralyzed by its wait for non-existent confirmations.
"SYNK" is a common SYN flood program that is widely
63
downloadable on the Internet.
2. UDP Flood Attacks
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attacks work in very much
the same manner as the SYN Flood attacks. In a server, the UDP
provides information about the server to other computers, such as the
server's local time, echo, chargen, etc.64 When the server is hit with
multiple requests for information about itself, the server can be
quickly overwhelmed by its inability to process so many UDP
packets. The result is total consumption of the server's processing
power and bandwidth, thereby "denying service" to others who are
trying to access the server. The problem is multiplied when a hacker
connects one computer's chargen port with another's echo port. The
result is the generation of a massive amount of packets that
65
overwhelm the system and render it useless.
63. SYNK, along with other DoS tools, is available on many hacking web sites. For
example, SYNK can be obtained at Warmaster's web site. See Warmaster(visited Apr. 5, 2000)
<http://www.warmaster.de/linw.htn>.
64. For example, the UDP "echo" provides a port that returns every packet sent to it. The
UDP "chargen" returns a packet with 0 to 512 characters chosen randomly. The UDP "time"
protocol provides the time in a site-independent, machine readable format. The client sends an
empty datagram to the port, and the server sends a datagram containing the time as a 32 bit
binary number.
65. See CERT CoordinationCenterReport CA-96.01: UDP PortDenial-of-ServiceAttack
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3.

ICMP Flood Attack

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) flood attack is
also similar to the above flood attacks. The ICMP is used to handle
errors and "pings." Pings are small "feelers" that are sent out to other
computers to see if they are turned on and connected to the same
network. 66 Ping is also used to determine if there is network
congestion and other network transport problems. When a ping
packet is sent to an IP broadcast address from a computer outside of
the remote computer's network, it is broadcast to all machines on the
target network.
The ICMP attack begins when a large number of forged ping
requests are sent to a broadcast address on a third-party's server.
These packets contain the return address of the intended victim. The
flood of ping requests causes the targeted server to answer with a
flood of responses which can cause both the target site and third-party
67
sites to crash.

A variation on the ICMP attack is the "Ping of Death." The Ping
of Death is a large ICMP packet that is sent to the target server. The
target receives the ping in fragments and starts to re-assemble the
packets as they arrive. However, the completed size of the packet is
larger than the buffer, or than the room the computer has allocated to
such packets, and the computer is overwhelmed, often resulting in the
68
server shutting down or freezing up.
4. New Generation Attacks
a. SmurfAttacks
These techniques are named after the programs that launch the
(visited
Mar.
17,
2000)
<http:llwww.securityfocus.comltemplates/archive.pike?list=21 &date=1996-0208&msg=v02120d01ad4092622ff2@[128.115.138.237]>.
66. See GUIDE TO (mostly) HARMLESS HACKING (visited Mar. 12, 2000)
<http:l/newdata.box.skfneworder/harmless/GTMHH2-3.TXT>.
67. As an example of this type of attack, consider the following: To launch a ping attack,
the attacker, using Computer A, gets the IP address of a computer he wants to bring down. If
Computer A is using Windows, all the attacker needs to do is go to the DOS prompt and enter
"c:\windows\ping -1 65510 targeted.computer.com." This command creates a giant datagram
that gets wrapped inside a packet that is sent to targeted.computer.com and overloads the
targeted computer as it tries to send the pin back. It is a very simple technique, and just as easy
to get caught if the attacker used his computer to launch the ping attack. However, the attacker
will typically spoof his location, making discovery more difficult.
68. See The Hack FAQ - Denial of Service Basics (visited Mar. 12, 2000)
<http://www.nmrc.org/faqs/hackfaq>.
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attacks. In a Smurf attack, the hacker sends out an ICMP echo
request packet, or "ping" command to a computer network with the
return IP address of the targeted victim. The network's server
broadcasts the "ping" through the system's network and the
computers send a reply back. If the network is large enough, those
packets will swamp the victim's computer and possibly bring the
computer down.69
b. Fraggle
The Fraggle attacks are similar to the Smurf attacks, except they
use UDP echo packets to overwhelm a network computer.
c. Papasmurf
Papasmurf combines Smurf and Fraggle by launching ping
requests with ICMP echo packets and UDP echo packets. This
program's two-headed assault makes it more difficult for
administrators to defend themselves.
5. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) are a natural
development in the search for more effective and debilitating denial
of service attacks. Instead of using just one computer to launch an
attack, the hacker enlists numerous computers to attack the target
computer from numerous launch points.7o Prior to an attack, the
hacker places a daemon, or a small computer program, on an innocent
third-party computer. These third-party computers are often referred
to as "zombies" or "soldiers." The "slave" daemons are remotely
controlled by the "master" program to launch attacks against certain
servers. By distributing the source of attacks across a wider array of
zombie computers, the attacker has made it more difficult for the
target server to block off the attack routes.
a. Trinoo (June 1999)
On August 17, 1999, a Trinoo network of at least 227 systems
was used to flood a single server at the University of Minnesota,
including more than 100 compromised computers at the University of
69. See Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Inst., CERT®Advisory CA-98.01 "smurf"
IP Denial-of-Service Attacks, (originally issued Jan. 5, 1998) (last modified Mar. 13, 2000)
<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.01 .smurf.html>.
70. See Brian Martin, Have Script, Will Destroy (Lessons in Dos), HACKER NEWS (visited
Mar. 13, 2000) <http:llwww.hackernews.com.bufferoverflow/00/dosattackldosattack.html>.
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Washington. 71 The attack rendered the system inoperable for two
days.
There has been speculation that Trinoo was one of the programs
that brought down Yahoo and other major Internet sites in February
2000.72 Trinoo is used to create distributed denial of service UDP
flood attacks. There is concern that Trinoo could enlist common
desktop computers in a DDoS attack by loading a daemon on the local
computer through an e-mail attachment. 73 According to one estimate,
Trinoo networks are "being set up on hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
systems that are being compromised by remote buffer overrun
exploitation." 74
After the attacker has placed the daemons on the intermediary
computers, master programs are set up on other computers to act as
commanders to call "the troops" into action. The attacker only needs
to access the master programs, via telnet, to launch the massive,
coordinated attacks. 75 Both the slave and master programs are
password controlled to prevent system administrators from taking
control of the Trinoo network. Once the attacker has accessed the
master, he only needs to enter the IP address of the targeted server in
a "dos IP" command to wake up the daemon "zombies" that begin
launching their massive queries at the target. The attacker is also able
to launch attacks against multiple targets using the "mdos"
command.76 Finally, the attacker can set a time limit for the DoS
attack.77
b. Tribe Flood Network (August 1999)
Tribe Flood Network, (TFN), is a DDoS program written by a

71. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Net's Newest Pains Most Likely Caused by Feuding Hackers,
SAN DiEGo UNIoN-TRm., Feb. 10, 2000, availablein 1999 WL 29194212.
72. See John Borland, New Attack Software Released; Web Sites Now Easier Targets For
Hackers, SEATrLE-POST INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24,2000, at E2, availablein 2000 WL 5289421.
73. See John Borland, Hackers Spread Simpler Toolsfor Vandals, CANBERRA TiMES, Feb.
28, 2000, at Al3.
74. David Dittrich, The DoS Project's "Trinoo" Distributed Denial of Service Attack
29, 1999)
<http:llwww.ussrback.comldocsldistributedltrinoo.analysis.txt>
Tool, (Oct.
[hereinafter Dittrich, DoS Project]. "A buffer overrun is when a program allocates a block of
memory of a certain length and then tries to stuff too much data into the buffer, with the extra
overflowing and overwriting possibly critical information crucial to the normal execution of the
program." Exploiting Windows NT 4 Buffer Overruns A Case Study, RASMAN.EXE (visited
Mar. 17,2000) <http:lnewdata.box.sklneworder/ntbufferoverruns.txt>.
75. See Dittrich, DoS Project,supra note 74.
76. See id.
77. See id.
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German hacker that is capable of launching ICMP, SYN Flood, UDP
Flood and Smurf attacks. 78 In late August, 1999, DDoS attackers
began to shift from Trinoo to TFN. Using TFN, a single attacker can
launch an attack from dozens of computers on which the attacker has
surreptitiously placed the TFN daemon. 79 The attacker remotely
controls the TFN client network using a variety of connection

methods, including telnet TCP connections. 0 Unlike various versions
of Trinoo, TFN clients do not require a password to be activated,
although the client sends commands to the daemon in an ICMP
packet.
However, there is no telnet TCP or UDP-based
communication between the client and the daemon, making detection
of the client's call to action more difficult to detect on the client, or
8
master, system. '
c. Tribe Floodnet2k (January2000)
Tribe Floodnet 2k (TFN2K) is an updated version of the TFN
DDoS attack tool. According to Mixter, the German hacker who
wrote the program, TFN2K still contains the popular features of the
original TFN, including the client/server functionality, stealth, and
encryption techniques. However, Mixter added several new features
that make the system more robust and deadly, including remote oneway command instructions to the distributed servers who go on to
launch the attacks. Also, TFN2K boasts stronger encryption between
82
the client and the server.
78. See David Dittrich, The "Tribe Flood Network" Distributed Denial of Service Attack
Tool, (Oct. 21, 1999) <http://www.ussrback.com/docs/distributed/tfn.analysis.txt > [hereinafter
Dittrich, Tribe FloodNetwork].
79. See Anatomy of an Attack, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19,2000, at 80,81.
80. See Dittrich, Tribe FloodNetwork supra note 78. Once the hacker has placed the
software on several client computers, the hacker needs to give commands to the client machines
to call them into battle. This is done through a variety of connection methods, including
common telnet connections. The client machines control the daemons who launch the attacks
against the final targets. The hacker can be thought of as a general in the Pentagon and the
clients are the field commanders orchestrating the combat units in an assault.
81. According to the readme.txt that is downloaded with the TFN program, the system is
easy to operate: "Usage: Install the server 'td' on a number of hosts. Put all IP addresses of the
hosts running the server into a list; this will be your iplist. Run the client." Id.
82. As an example of this type of attack, consider the following: If the attacker, using
computer A, wanted to launch a DDoS assault on Computer F, then he would install "servers"
on Computers B, C and D. Computer A can give instructions to B, C and D by randomly
choosing to send the command on TCP, UDP or ICMP protocols. The internal values, or the
packet's "identification papers," are optimized by the software so there is no identifiable pattern
to the packets that would otherwise cause a server or router's filtering method to reject it. Then
the TFN servers that were placed on Computers B, C and D decode the message that contains
Computer A's spoofed, or false identification papers and begin launching an attack against
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d. Stacheldraht(October 1999)

The most recent advance in DDoS attacks has come in the form
of Stacheldraht, a German word for "Barbed Wire." Stacheldraht has
the ability to automatically update the daemon programs, reducing the
attacker's risk of intrusion.83 Stacheldraht was based on the source
code from Tribe Flood Network, with at least two significant new
features.
The communication between the attacker and the
Stacheldraht masters are encrypted and the daemons can be
automatically updated by the masters. One of the weaknesses of TFN
was the attacker's connection to the master program located on the
remote computers.
Stacheldraht combines Trinoo's master/daemon control features
with TFN's ICMP flood, SYN flood, UDP flood, and Smurf attacks.' 4
The attackers control the master computers through encrypted clients,
and each master can control up to 1000 daemons that are installed on
innocent third-party computers.8 5 The attack begins in the preparation
stage, called the "mass-intrusion phase," where large numbers of
computers are compromised.86 The attacker places the Stacheldraht
daemons on the compromised systems and the daemons lie in wait for
the command to attack. The third-party computers are also victims in
these attacks because the systems have been compromised and they
use up bandwidth and processing power.
6. Tracking Down the Attackers
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has had a very
difficult time locating the origin of the attackers because of the
networked nature of the Internet, the spoofing of the DoS packets, and
the procedural difficulty of organizing an investigation that involves
countless jurisdictions. One method used to track the attacker is to
start from the targeted server and locate the immediate server that sent
the packet. 87 However, because the packet was carrying "false
Computer F. In order to further trip up egress filtering, custom IP addresses may be used to
defeat the spoof filtering defense. Also, the program allows decoy packets to be sent out to
Computers G to Z to hide the real location of Computers B, C and D that contain the TFN
servers.
83. See Anatomy of an Attack, supra note 79 at 81.
84. See Dave Dittrich, The "stacheldraht"distributeddenial of service attack tool (Dec.
31, 1999) <http://www.ussrback.com/docs/distributed/stacheldraht.analysis>
[hereinafter
Dittrich, Stacheldraht].
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Martin, supra note 70.
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identification," each subsequent router along the network could lead

the investigator astray 5s
Because the packet's "false papers" hide the true origin of the
packet, it is difficult to reconstruct the origin of the spoofed packets
after the fact. In order to determine where the packet came from, the
investigators must set up a filer, or "trace and trap," before they arrive
at that particular router. This is complicated by fact that the packet
could cross as many as thirty different routers owned by ten different

companies in several different legal jurisdictions.89 In the February,
2000 attacks on the major Internet sites, the authorities have identified
several university computers that were compromised and used to
attack the targeted servers. 90
The actual technique of spoofing can be complicated. For
example, a traditional method of spoofing was to initiate a DoS attack
on Computer B, the computer that one eventually wants to spoof.

When Computer B is overwhelmed, it is not able to respond to
requests from Computer C that it is requesting ACKs, or
confirmation-trying to confirm they are who they said they are. The
TCP tags each datagram with a sequential number. If Computer C
receives a packet that is out of sequence, it will discard the packet or
hold, depending on how close the packet is to the number it is looking
for. The hacker, using Computer A, estimates the number that
Computer C is looking for and pretends to be sending packets from

Computer B by using Computer B's information or identification.
Computer B is unable to stop this use of his identification because he
is spending all of his time answering the false packets from another
88. Mixter, the German hacker who authored Tribe Flood Network, comments that "[lt
will be virtually impossible to track the attackers down.... Every provider would have to
scrutinize their router logs tracing back traffic to its point of origin, and that's a time-intensive
process and an enormous undertaking." lain S.Bruce, The Hack Pack SUNDAY HERALD, Feb.
13, 2000, availablein 2000 WL 4100421.
89. See "Trap and Trace" Authority on the Internet Urged by DOJ, FBI, COMM. DAILY,
Mar. 2, 2000, availablein 2000 WL 4694585 [hereinafter Trap and Trace].
90. According to the Department of Justice, the federal trap and trace statutes (18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-3127 (1994)) are out-of-date with Internet investigative requirements. "Pen registers"
that record dialed telephone numbers and the trap and trace devices that capture incoming
electronic packets to identify their origin, are not specifically covered by the statutes. Rather,
the statute refers to a "device" that is "attached" to a telephone "fine." See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3127(3) (1994). However, traffic on the Internet is not traced by telephone number, but rather
by IP addresses and other information wrapped inside the packets. Also, telephone companies
no longer physically connect devices to lines to route calls and Internet traffic. Instead, calls
and traffic are routed by a series of electronic switches, often without wires. See Department of
Justice, The Electronic Frontier:The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the
Internet - A Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet
(Mar. 2000) <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrime/unlawful.htm>.
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computer that the hacker has set up to send the packets.
7. The CFAA and Denial of Service
In any criminal law analysis, the specifics of the crime will
determine which statutory section can be successfully applied. For
example, the exact definition of an "intrusion" can determine -whether
inserting a debit card into a exterior cash machine constitutes
burglary. The individual characteristics of a Denial of Service attack
may also change which computer crime statutes can be applied to the
attack. For example, in the above TFN2K example where the attacker
used Computer A to plant "servers" on Computers B, C, and D to
attack Computer F, will a traditional hacking statute be applicable for
the attack on Computer F? Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C),
the statute prohibits "access" of a protected computer. 91 However, are
these anti-hacking statutes applicable to an attacker whose intent was
to "deny access" to, rather than to merely access, the computer?
The CFAA is the primary federal anti-hacking statute, and
contains seven main sections. The first section, § 1030(a)(1), protects
against the knowing access of government computers to obtain
classified information. This section is not applicable.
The second section, § 1030(a)(2), proscribes the intentional
access of a computer without, or in excess of authorization, to
thereby obtain information from a financial institution, the federal
government, or any protected computer involved in interstate or
foreign communications-essentially any computer connected to the
Internet. 92 This section is concerned with the protection of
information. The point of all of the DoS attacks is not to obtain
information, but rather to bring the system down.
The third section, § 1030(a)(3), is concerned with the intentional
and unauthorized access of government computers or computers used
by the government. In a standard DoS attack where only one
computer is used to attack another, this section is unlikely to be
invoked unless the attacker targeted a computer that "is used by or for
the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use
by or for the Government of the United States. 9 3 However, in a
DDoS attack, there is a better chance that this section may be relevant
if the attacker placed an attack daemon on a § 1030(a)(3) protected
computer. Many university computers, for example, are used by the
91.
92.
93.

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1999).
See Hatcher et al., supra note 1, at 403.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3).
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federal government. Even slight activity by the daemon on the
university computer could "affect" the government's use of the
computer.
The fourth section, § 1030(a)(4), addresses the access and
fraudulent use of a protected computer and is triggered if the value of
the use obtained exceeds $5,000. Congress intended this subsection
to apply, for example, to use by hackers who take over a
supercomputer to run a password-breaking program. The "zombie"
computers who were infected by the daemon and enlisted into the
attack suffered a loss of processor power and bandwidth. This
subsection could be applied against the attacker for each computer the
hacker enlisted in the assault. With the subsection providing for a jail
term for up to five years per instance, a hacker who plants hundreds
of daemons could be liable for an extensive prison sentence.
One of the critiques of this subsection is the $5,000 damage
threshold. Prosecutors have found that the $5,000 damage
requirement is often both difficult to establish and an impediment to
investigation. It is sometimes speculative to assess $5,000 damages if
the attacker only used the computer to launch attacks. In United
States v. Middleton,9 4 the defendant challenged the government's
theory of calculating the $5,000 in damages to Slip.net, an Internet
Service Provider (ISP). The court held that the government's theory
of loss "will be that the damage caused by defendant to the Slip.net
computers caused Slip.net employees to expend time to investigate,
identify, and correct the damage caused by Middleton, and take other
security related steps." 95 The court agreed with the government "that
the time the employees expended can be fairly valued at a figure of at
least their hourly wage or salary, plus the value of benefits and
overhead" provided adequate explanation of the government's
theory.96
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the factors used to
calculate the $5,000, federal authorities currently have to wait for a
damage assessment to determine if there is federal jurisdiction,

94. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
95. Id. at 1193.
96. Id; see also United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelinesfor United
States Courts, Part1!, 62 Fed. Reg. 26616 (1997), availablein 1997 WL 243415, which states:
In an offense involving unlawfully accessing, or exceeding authorized access to,
a protected computer as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) or (B) loss includes
the reasonable cost to the victim of conducting a damage assessment, restoring
the system and data to their condition prior to the offense, and any lost revenue
due to interruption of service.
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delaying time-sensitive investigations. For example, if a DoS attack
is launched on a California web site, but the attack originated in New
York, was routed through a server in New Jersey, and bounced off a
computer in Wisconsin on its way to California, investigators may be
required to petition the court in each jurisdiction for an order to place
a trace on the activity. 97 Under a new legislative proposal by Senators
Charles Schumer and Jon Kyl, the federal government would
unambiguously permit federal jurisdiction as soon as the attack
98
Also,
occurs, rather than waiting for the damage assessment.
misdemeanor,
a
as
treated
damage estimates below $5,000 will be
while damage above $5,000 will still be treated as a felony. Finally,
proposed legislation specifies that the costs of responding to the
attack, damage assessment costs, repair to the system and lost revenue
from the interruption of service will be counted toward the $5,000
damage amount. 99 Under the present statute, the damage calculation
method is unclear and there has been little judicial precedent to
provide guidance for allowable damage factors.100
The fifth section, § 1030(a)(5), is the main anti-hacking
Subsection 1030(a)(5)(A) applies to whomever
subsection.
"knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code,
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes
damage without authorization, to a protected computer."'01 The DoS
and DDoS attacker would be liable under this subsection both to the
"zombie" systems and to the targeted systems. The attacker causes
the transmission of a program on the "zombie" system and
The attacker also causes the
intentionally causes damage.
transmission of information, the packets, and code, the datagrams that
This subsection provides serious
intentionally cause damage.
sentencing guidelines. A first-time conviction can subject the attacker
to up to five years in prison for each occurrence. According to United
States Sentencing Commission, "[i]f the defendant is convicted under
18 U.S.C. Section 1030 (a)(4) or (5), the minimum guideline

97. See Internet Denialof Service Attacks and the FederalResponse: Panel I Of A Joint
HearingOf Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm. and the CriminalJustice Oversight
Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Denial of Service
Attacks] (statement of Charles E. Schumer, United States Senator, New York).
98. See Office of Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Offers Legislative Package to Combat
2000)
16,
(Feb.
Hacking
Online
<http:llwww.senate.gov/-schumerlhtml/schumer.-offers-legislative-pac.html>.

99. See id.
100. See id.
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
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sentence, notwithstanding any other adjustment, shall be six months'
imprisonment."102
Section 1030(a)(5)(B) prohibits unauthorized access that
recklessly causes damage to a protected computer. 03 Violation of this
subsection is also a felony. However, the standard of reckless
disregard is below the intentional damage provided under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A). If the prosecutor can show that the damage was
intentional, as all DoS and DDoS attacks are, then the reckless
disregard is unnecessary.
Section 1030(a)(5)(C) covers negligent damage to a protected
computer. There is almost no conceivable scenario where this
subsection could be used. Congress intended to punish the activity of
hackers who do not intend to harm the systems but accidentally cause
harm to the computer in the process. To only punish intentional harm
would condone hacking into systems as long as no harm was done to
the system.104 However, in DoS and DDoS attacks, there could be no
other reason a person would plant a daemon on another computer, or
launch a DoS attack against another computer. Perhaps it is feasible
that a curious computer user would enter a large ping command for
another computer without a full understanding of the consequences.
However, such conduct would be more reckless than negligent.
The sixth section, § 1030(a)(6), is concerned with the
unauthorized trafficking of computer passwords and is not relevant to
DoS attacks. Likewise, § 1030(a)(7) covers extortion threats against
computer or network owners. This subsection would only be invoked
if the attacker threatened to launch a DoS attack against the victim
unless the victim pays the attacker "any money or other thing of
value." 0 5
102. United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, Part11, 63 Fed. Reg. 602 (1998), available in 1998 WL 1699.
103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
104. One group of commenators suggests that:
[SItate and federal governments should immediately decriminalize all forms of
non-malicious hacking. Non-malicious hacking should be defined as obtaining
unauthorized access to a protected computer without causing intentional or
reckless damage. Successful incidents of unauthorized access should be
presumed by law to be non-malicious if the actor makes a good-faith effort to
report the incident to the proprietor of the accessed system immediately upon
obtaining access.
Lee et al., supra note 2, at 882-83. However, it could be argued that such a recommendation is
the equivalent of de-criminalizing breaking and entering into a store with non-malicious intent if
the burglars make a good faith effort to tell the owner they broke into the store. See id.
105. Bruce, supranote 88. None of the eight major companies that were hit by the DDoS
attacks in February have reported that they received extortion threats. See id.
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8. DoS Summary

Denial of Service attacks represent a significant threat to the
stability of our network infrastructure because of the inherent
vulnerability in the TCP/IP 3-handshake reliable protocol. Successful
prosecution of the perpetrators should raise the awareness that DoS
and DDoS are very serious crimes with serious consequences. Also,
system administrators are likely to collaborate in devising plans for
rapid network response to thwart the source of the attacks. However,
where the system administrator's carrot may be minimized damage to
their systems, the stick may be potential tort liability for allowing
their system to be used in an attack against another server. 106 The tort
standard of negligence could be: would a "reasonably prudent system
administrator" have allowed a hacker to place a DDoS daemon on his
system, and "but for" his negligence, the targeted server would not
have been overloaded without his contribution? If the "zombie"
computers were held liable for negligent administration of their
servers, this also may help secure the Internet against DDoS attacks.
Finally, the CFAA provides for a civil action for those who suffer any
damage or loss against someone who violates 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
The laws are in place to address the issue. Unfortunately, the greatest
impediment to prosecuting will continue to be technical difficulty of
tracing the route of the attack back to the perpetrator.
B. Web Site Defacing and MaliciousInterference: UserLevel
and Root Level Hacks
There are several reasons why a hacker would seek to hack into a
web site and change a web page.107 Web site hackers range from
teenage pranksters to foreign powers seeking intelligence, and
everything in between. Increasingly, there is a divide between the
"old school" and "new school" hackers.108 The "old school" hackers
are associated more with the "Hacker's Ethics," a text that has been
available on hacking newsgroups for several years.10 9 The rift
106. See Eric J.Sinrod & Bill Reilly, Lessons of DoS Attacks, UPsIDE TODAY, (Feb. 29,
2000) <http:lwww.upside.comltexis/mvmlstory?id=38b6dcbeO>.
107. According to the Director of the NIPC, "[Hackers] sometimes crack into networks
simply for the thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community. Recently,
however, we have seen more cases of hacking for illicit financial gain or other malicious
purposes." CyberattackInvestigation, supranote 25.
108. Robert Richardson, Hackers:Devils or Saints?,NETWORK, June 1997, at 62.
109. According to one hacker: "True hackers want to learn, or want to satisfy their
curiosity, that's why they get into the system. To search around inside of a place the you've
never been, to explore all the little nooks and crannies of a world so unlike the boring cess-pool
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between the two schools is often referred to as the "Black Hats"
against the "White Hats." 0 The "old school" hackers complain that
the widespread availability of ready-to-hack software does not require
the level of sophistication that hacking required ten years ago,
creating more opportunities to maliciously hack into systems without
an understanding of the impact. They argue that irresponsible
hacking has led to a higher profile of the "hobby" and a wave of new
criminal laws that punishes both non-malicious intrusions and
malicious intrusions. The "new school" hackers assert that many of
the "old school" hackers have "sold out" to corporations as security
experts."'
For the purposes of our discussion, hacking techniques will be
divided into three large areas based on the hacker's intent. We will
primarily address damage caused by non-authorized persons, not
insiders who exceed their authorization." 2 The first major section is
web site defacing and malicious interference with a web site,
excluding Denial of Service attacks." 3 The second major section is
unauthorized access for information and financial gain.
Basic Hacking Techniques:
There are as many hacking techniques as there are hackers. One
common technique that is technically not a "hacking" technique, but
is nevertheless a criminal violation, is the "cookie" exploit. A cookie
is simply an HTTP header that consists of a text-only string that gets
entered into the "memory" of a browser. This string contains the
domain, path, lifetime, and value of a variable that a web site sets. If
the lifetime of this variable is longer than the time the user spends at
that site, then this string is saved to file for future reference." 4 For
example, when a person signs up with a password and user name on a
web site, the user's identification information is placed on the user's
computer in the form of a cookie. When the user revisits the web site,
the web site recognizes the user so that the user does not have to reenter identifying information. However, some older web browsers
(sic] we live in." Dissident, supra note 14.
110. See generally Ashley Dunn, A Haute Commodity; Hacking, Er, Vulnerability
Analysis, Is Big Business, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1998, at DI, D3.
111. See id.
112. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1)-(4); (5)(A) (West Supp. 1999) (including both persons
who exceed their authorized access, as well as persons without authorization).
113. See discussion supra Part IIL.A.
114. See David Whalen, The Unofficial Cookie FAQ, Cookie Central (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http:llwww.cookiecentral.comlfaql#1.1>.
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allow remote sites to retrieve cookies that were not planted by them,
enabling malicious web site operators to "steal" the cookie,
effectively retrieving the username and password. For example,
Buysellzone.com allows registered users to place ads and have access
to the various classified ad centers on their server. However, the
cookie on the user's computer holds the user's name and password in
text format, not encrypted, so anyone with access to the user's
5
cookie.txt file can access the user's account.'"
Depending upon the purpose of the intrusion, the risk level the
hacker is willing to assume, the type of server, the remote and local
operating systems, and countless other variables, there is a different
hacking technique that can be deployed. Rather than exploring the
details of several different techniques, for the purposes of gaining
enough knowledge to understand the applicable provisions in 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a), it should be adequate to walk the reader through
11 6
two hypothetical hacks.
Regardless of whether the hacker intends to deface a web site or
steal information, the ultimate technical objective is to "get root."
The "root level" is also often referred to as the "god" account, where
the "god" account has access to the entire system."7 The root level
provides the hacker with the same permissions and privileges as the
system administrator. If the hacker can "penetrate" to the root level,
he will be able to, among countless other possibilities, change
passwords, access files, change web site files, re-route server traffic,
and steal credit card numbers if the server is reckless enough to store
unencrypted credit card numbers on its site." 8 Once the hacker "gets
root," he must eliminate traces of his intrusion-his digital
footprints-so the system administrator is unaware of his access.
However, not all hacks require "root access" to damage or
change files on the server. Our first example is a relatively
unsophisticated hack that only requires access to a user's account on
115. Most cookies are encrypted so that the information that is collected by the company
that placed it on your computer is not readable to anyone except the company who encrypted it.
On the one hand, this provides a level of security that prevents others from obtaining that
information. However, the computer user is also unable to know that type of information that is
being collected. It is important to note that cookies are text files, and therefore can not support a
virus or software code that can place malicious scripts on a individual's computer.
116. A few other details have been changed to give the reader an overview of the process,
so as not to provide a guidebook on how to actually hack a web site.
117. See Appendix A.
118. See David L. Gripman, The Doors are Locked but the Thieves and Vandals are Still
Getting In: A Proposalin Tort to Alleviate CorporateAmerica's Cyber-Crime Problem, 16 .
MARsHALL J. CoMPuTER & INFo. L. 167,169-70 (1997).
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the server. We will refer to this as a "user-level hack." The second
example demonstrates a "root access" hack that is significantly more
dangerous to the integrity of the machine, although the statutes do not
make the distinction. According to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), "access" is
not defined by the level of penetration. Breaching the system in any
manner to obtain information, obtain something of value or cause
damage is enough to trigger the statutory liability. For the terms of
this paper, we will refer to this type of hack as a "root access hack."
One way to explain the difference between the two hacks is to
compare them to a non-technical example-a hotel. On "hosted"
web sites, where the user "rents" web space on another company's
server, there are two different levels of access: that of the system
administrator and that of the lessee. In a hotel, there are also two
main levels of access: the hotel management and the hotel guest. A
guest only has a key to access a room (user access), while
management has keys to access all of the rooms, as well as the back
office, front door and the storeroom (system administrator's root
access). A hacker who is able to "get root" has access to the
management's keys, thereby gaining full access to everything in the
hotel. However, just because someone has the hotel's "all access"
key, does not necessarily mean they can enter the restricted areas
freely because there are security guards (system administrators) and
security cameras (server access logs). The goal of the "root hacker"
is to enter unnoticed, compromise the security, and depart the scene
without leaving any traces of his visit.
1. Example of a User-level Hack
Hacker wants to access a computer to deface a web site that was
developed using Microsoft FrontPage. Hacker employs a technique
that exploits a "bug" in FrontPage web sites that use FrontPage server
extensions." 9 The first thing that Hacker must address is how to
prevent his access from being traced. There are many ways to hide
119.

For example:
The FrontPage Server Extensions are a set of programs on a Web server that
let the [webmaster] administer, author, and browse a FrontPage-based Web-a
structure containing all of the pages, images, subdirectories, and other files that
make up a Web site.
The Server Extensions use standard Web server extensions interfaces, such as
CGI and ISAPI, and work with virtually all existing Web servers. This design
allows the FrontPage Server Extensions to be ported easily to all popular
hardware and software platforms for cross-platform, Web-server compatibility.
Configuring and Deploying Microsoft FrontPage 2000 Server Extensions, (Oct. 1998)
<http://www.microsoft.com/technet/FrontPg/TechNote/fpserext.asp>.
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the origination of the hack, such as spoofing.' 20 In this case, because
Hacker does not want the victim to be able to trace him back to his
point of origin, Hacker uses a laptop computer and a converted
telephone lineman's handset to tap into the outside box of a
neighbor's house by connecting two alligator clips to the appropriate
box terminals. Hacker conducts the attack in the daytime, when the
owner of the phone is not home, and the network traffic on the target
1 21
site is more active.
The next objective is to ascertain the user name and password for
the site's webmaster, or the lessee, so he can access the web files on
the server. 22 Hacker dials into a free ISP located in another region of
the country to complicate the multi-company tracing investigation.
Once he is on-line, Hacker enters an exploitative URL address that
contains the "service.pwd.' 1 23 Most web sites that use FrontPage
server extensions locate the service.pwd in a predictable directory. If
the server administrator was careless in setting up the "chmod"
command that tells the server who can do what in a directory, such as
granting the owner, groups or the public to read, write and execute
files within the directory, then Hacker will be able to read a string of
text that looks like the following: "kathy:paB.lMg4MB6MF."' 24
Hacker can already determine that the webmaster's username is
"kathy." Now all that Hacker has to do is add a few commands to the
password string, insert the password string into a DES decrypting
password cracker and viola, Hacker has the webmaster's password as
well.125 From there, Hacker downloads the web page he wants to
deface, alters the web page with his favorite web editor, and uploads
the file to the server and the web page is "owned."
Applicable Federal Criminal Statutes:
In the above scenario, Hacker has broken numerous laws.
Hacker would be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(7) which prohibits

120. See discussion supraPart LI.A.6.
121. However, he could also attack at night when the system administrator is more unlikely
to be monitoring the site.
122. Web hosting companies provide space on their server for individuals and companies
who wish to have a presence on the internet without the need to maintain their own servers.
123. An "exploitive URL" is a URL that contains a certain string of letters and numbers
that instruct the receiving server to respond in an unauthorized manner.
124. All UNIX and Linux directories have an access level control called the CHMOD that
determines the access level of different groups.
125. Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a relatively weak encryption technique that is
often used to encrypt passwords on a system.
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the knowing possession of a "telecommunications instrument that has
been modified or altered to obtain unauthorized use of
telecommunications services" with the intent to defraud. 126 Hacker
modified the modem and the lineman's handset, also known as a
"beige box.' 27 Also, Hacker may be liable for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343, which prohibits the intentional scheming to obtain
"money2 or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses" by
"wire."'
In United States v. Freeman, 29 the court held that the use
of a "blue box" to bypass long distance charges is a taking of property
under § 1343. Hacker intentionally schemed to take "property" from
the phone company or the victim whose phone line he tapped with the
telephone lineman's handset. A violation of the subsection carries a
30
prison term of not more than five years.
One of the difficulties prosecutors face with many of the
subsections under § 1030(a) is the requirement for "damage," which
is defined as a loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during a one
year period.' 3' If only the text of a web page is altered in the attack,
and the system is not "damaged," then meeting the $5,000 threshold
may be difficult. The subsections that penalize only the "access" with
no damage requirement, § 1030(a)(1)-(3), have an easier burden to
meet. However, unless the hacker has broken into a computer that
contains restricted data;' 32 has received information valued at more
than $5,000;133 committed acts in the furtherance of another criminal

126.
127.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1029(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999).
According to the Jargon Dictionary, "phreaking" is the:
[A]rt and science of cracking the phone network (so as, for example, to make
free long-distance calls)....
... There was significant crossover between the hacker community and the
hard-core phone phreaks who ran semi-underground networks of their own
through such media as the legendary "TAP Newsletter." This ethos began to
break down in the mid-1980s as wider dissemination of the techniques put them
in the hands of less responsible phreaks. Around the same time, changes in the
phone network made old-style technical ingenuity less effective as a way of
hacking it, so phreaking came to depend more on overtly criminal acts such as
stealing phone-card numbers....
The
Jargon
Dictionary
(visited
Mar.
9,
2000)
<http://www.netmeg.netljargonlterms/p.html#phreaking>.
128. 18 U.S.C § 1343 (1994).
129. 524 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1975).
130. See 18 U.S.C § 1343 (1994).
131. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
132. See id. § 1030(a)(1).
133. See id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii).
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or tortious act; 3 4 or committed acts for commercial or private
financial gain, 13 5 the crime is only a misdemeanor. The three
subsections that measure a threshold value of at least $5,000 for
information, anything of value, or damage, are often difficult to prove
13 6
in the type of hack explained above.
If the web site that Hacker altered was located on a computer
that is used by or for the government of the United States, then he
could be liable for a misdemeanor violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(3), which criminalizes the intentional access of such non137
public computers.
Hacker could be charged with a misdemeanor violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), which protects any information intentionally
obtained from a protected computer. The "information" he obtained
would be the web site owner's user name and password, along with
any other information he may have viewed. The courts have held that
"accessing" of information is not limited to taking the information.
"Access" applies to the "intent" to access, not the "intent" to damage
the protected computer. 13 Viewing the information on the computer
is considered "access." In other words, the mens rea for this crime is
the intent to access the computer and there is no requirement for the
actual transport of the information. Also, if Hacker defaced the web
site with a "url redirect" to his own company's web site, then the
charge could be bumped up to a felony for those acts considered for
139
commercial advantage or private financial gain.
Prosecutors may be able to charge Hacker with a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) if they can show he obtained something of value
worth more than $5,000 or § 1030(a)(5) if they can show Hacker
140
caused $5,000 or more damage.
134. See id. at (ii).
135. See id. at (i).
136. Section 1030(a)(4) uses a $5,000 damage threshold. Section 1030(a)(2) violations are
misdemeanors unless the access was for personal gain, the value exceeded $5,000, or they were
committed in furtherance of another crime.
137. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
138. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865,867 (9th Cir. 1996).
139. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1999).
140. Please note that Hacker would still be liable for any state anti-hacking statutes even if
the federal government was unable to meet the statutory threshold for Federal jurisdiction.
However, a discussion of state statutes is beyond the scope of this article. The definition of
"damage" under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (in addition to the $5,000 threshold), includes any
impairment to the integrity of a protected computer that modifies or impairs the medical
examination, diagnosis or care of one or more individuals, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8)(B)
(West Supp. 1999); causes physical injury to any person, see id. at (C); or threatens public
health or safety, see id. at (D). In this scenario, none of these other definitions of "damage" are
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Under § 1030(a)(4), merely viewing the information may not
meet the statute's definition of "obtaining" information.1 4' Congress
intended to punish the theft of information, not merely punish
unauthorized access. 42 In United States v. Czubinski, an Internal
Revenue Service employee was charged with the unauthorized access
of confidential income tax records. However, the court found that he
only viewed the information and did not use the information in any
manner. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the information
obtained "is the showing of some additional end-to which the
unauthorized access is a means-that is lacking here.' 1 43 However, in
Hacker's case, he did use the user information he obtained as a means
to the additional end of hacking the web site.
2. Example of a "Root-Access" Hack
The objective of this hack is to obtain a higher system privilege
than in a user-level attack, or in other words, to get the manager's "all
access" keys. The first part of the hack entails getting access to the
password files. The second part is cracking the password or taking
advantage of a server "bug" that will allow access to the more
privileged "root" level. Once at the "root" level, the hacking goal can
be achieved, whether it is planting a Trojan, 144 obtaining sensitive
files, downloading the system password files, stealing stored
unencrypted credit card numbers, etc. The third part of the hack is
covering the intrusion tracks and installing a "backdoor" that will
allow future access. In this part, the system logs are modified to
remove traces of the attack. Once these three steps have been
achieved, the hacker is considered to "own" the system.
Hacker targets a system he wants to "own," a small business ISP
that offers web site space on its server. On the ISP's system is a small
company web site that sells products over the Internet and stores
credit card information on the web site in a weakly encrypted form.
Hacker also wants to plant a Tribe Flood Network daemon on the
45
site.
146
The first thing Hacker does is to sign on for a trial "shell"'

likely.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997).
See id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IH.C.3.
See discussion supraPart IHL.A.5.b.
See Appendix A.
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account under an assumed identity with the ISP. With shell access,
Hacker telnets into his shell account and enters a series of commands
that exploit a "Sendmail" program. 147 Due to the "hole" in the
Sendmail program, the telnet commands write a message directly to
the "/etc/passwd" directory that gives Hacker a password-free root
account. However, this exploit could leave several traces and may
not grant him the complete access he needs to steal the credit cards,
although he should be able to plant the daemon. Once he has root
access, his next objective is to download the system's passwords so
he can log on as another user, reducing his chances of being caught.
After Hacker has downloaded the systems passwords, he has to
decipher them. After a user has created a password, the password is
scrambled in an algorithm to generate a "one-way hash. ' 14 This
requires extensive computer processing power. Many password
crackers hack into more power computers to run the cracking
Congress specifically intended to apply 18 U.S.C.
programs.
§ 1030(4) to the use of another's computer processing power. Senator
Jon Kyl noted during Senate discussion of the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 that the bill:
[A]mends 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) to ensure that felony-level
sanctions apply when unauthorized use, or use in excess of
authorization, is significant. Hackers, for example, have broken
into computers only for the purpose of using their processing
programs, sometimes amassing computer time worth far more than
$5,000. The bill would penalize those whose trespassing, in which
only computer use is obtained, amounts to greater than $5,000
during any one year period. Companies should not be stuck with
the bill for electronic joyriders. Although they may not damage or
147. Sendmail is a freeware program that many systems use to handle e-mail assignments.
This exploit is for an older version of send mail and was patched several years ago. Although it
is beyond the scope of the article to give specific hacking techniques, a non-specific
demonstration of the process should be adequate to provide the elements for a statutory analysis.
See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d. 504, 506 (2nd Cir. 1991) (Robert Morris describes a
Sendmail exploit as one of the methods he used to launch his worm program.).
148. Most servers do not "decrypt" a password when a user enters a password on a site.
Instead, the password is run through the algorithm to generate a one-way hash. If the hash
matches the hash that is associated with the user name, then the password is valid. The
passwords that Hacker downloaded were really just "hashes." Hacker must run the passwords
through a password "cracker," which is a program that runs words and number combinations
through known algorithms continuously until a match with the stolen password appears. The
word that generated the matching algorithm is the password. The most common password
cracking techniques are Dictionary Crackers and Brute Force Crackers. A Dictionary Cracker
runs a database of words through the algorithms one a time until a match is found. A Brute
Force Cracker runs every possible combination of words and letters together until the password
is found.
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steal information, hackers who browse through computer systems
are a significant liability to businesses who must pay for a new
security system, and the expensive time the hacker used. 149

After Hacker has cracked the password, he will log into the small
business' account by File Transfer Protocol (FTP), go to the directory
where the credit card numbers are stored and download the files.
However, his access to the directory will be logged somewhere by the
system administrator. Hacker must either use his root account, or any
other password to edit the log files. Hacker will try to determine if
there is anyone else on the system. If the system is clear, Hacker
would explore the system to find where the log files are stored and
uses a "rootkit" that will automate the sweeping up of intrusion by
replacing several critical files. 5 0 Hacker will create a "hidden"
directory on the server that will enable the directory to avoid
detection with a standard Linux "ls" command which shows a list of
5
directories in a given path.' '
Hacker will then hide the "rootkit" in the hidden directory. In
addition, if Hacker wants to continue to "own" the site for future
access, he can leave a "backdoor" on the system in a modified binary
that will enable him to bypass the current, and possibly any future
security measures. 52 In this case, Hacker will place a Trojan program
in the /bin/login/ directory under a specific user name configured for
telnet logins so he can re-enter the system with the minimum amount
of attention. In addition, Hacker could plant a "sniffer" that will
capture all network traffic, including the user names, passwords, and
credit card information. The "sniffer" will log all of the activity in a
file for Hacker to retrieve at a later time. After Hacker is ready to
wind up his hacking intrusion, he will initiate the "Trojan binaries" to
wipe the log files and log off of the system.
Applicable Federal Criminal Statutes:
In a "root access" hack, the potential for serious crime escalates
because of the information that can be obtained, the damage that can
be caused, and the value of data obtained. One way to analyze

149. National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996: Hearings on S. 982,
104th Cong. 90 (1996) [hereinafter Hearingson S. 982] (statement of United States Senator Jon
Kyl, United States Senetor, Arizona).
150. See Lance Spitzner, They Gain Root, Know Your Enemy: III (last modified Aug. 13,
1999) <http://www.enteract.com/-lspitz/enemy3.html>.
151. See id.

152. See id.
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§ 1030(a) is to first look at the type of computer that was targeted. If
the computer was a federal government computer or a computer used
by or for the federal government, then § 1030(a)(1)-(3) could apply.
However, in the example above, Hacker most likely targeted a private
ISP computer. The next step in the analysis is to determine if the
hacker obtained information, 53 obtained anything more than $5,000 in
value, 154 or damaged the protected computer. 5 5 At the point when
Hacker exploited a hole in the Sendmall program, he did not obtain
any information, nor did he arguably obtain anything of value, or do
over $5,000 damage to the computer at this point.
However, Hacker's next move, downloading the password files,
is clearly obtaining information under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) and
Hacker is liable for a misdemeanor unless the prosecution can show
that the value exceeds $5,000, was for personal gain, or was
committed in furtherance of another crime.156 Section 1030(a)(2)(3)
was meant to protect privacy where the value of the information,
although lacking quantifiable monetary value, is nevertheless valuable
in terms of privacy. Also, during congressional hearings on the
CFAA, Senator Leahy noted that if:
[T]he information obtained is of minimal value, the penalty is only
a misdemeanor. If, on the other hand, the offense is committed for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or if
the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000, the penalty
57
is a felony."'
If Hacker downloaded an entire batch of passwords, the
prosecution may be able to argue that the aggregate value of the web
site's security was more than $5,000, triggering § 1030(a)(4) liability.
Hacker's theft and possession of the credit card numbers is a
violation of several statutes. First, Hacker could be liable under 15
U.S.C. § 1644(b), which proscribes the transport of stolen credit
cards. In United States v. Callihan158 the court held that the
defendant did not "transport" the credit card when he gave the credit

153.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1999).

154. See id. § 1030(a)(4).
155. See id. at (5).
156. See id. § 1030(c)(2)(B).
157. Hearings on S. 982, supra note 149 (statement of Patrick Leahy, United States
Senator, Vermont).
158. 666 F.2d 422,424 (9th Cir. 1982).
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card number over the phone. The court concluded that the numbers
by themselves did not meet the statutory language of "credit card,"
which "as used in section 1644 means the small, flat tablet upon
which a credit card account number is imprinted, but does not mean
that number alone."' 5 9 However, a year later, in United States v. BiceBey, 60 another court held that an individual who orders goods with a
fictitious name by telephone, using credit card numbers without the
authorization of card holders, although she did not have cards in her
possession, nevertheless violated 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a), since a core
element of a credit card is the number, which can be used over
telephone without seller ever seeing the plastic card itself. Although
the Bice-Bey decision concerned the "use" of the credit card, the court
still held that the credit card numbers transferred over the phone
constituted a violation of § 1644(a).
Also, Hacker most likely violated 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) if he
obtained more than fifteen credit card numbers.'' Section 1029(a)(3)
states that it is a punishable offense to "knowingly and with intent to
defraud possesses fifteen or more devices which are counterfeit or
' 2
unauthorized access devices.'
According to 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1), an "access device" means:
[A]ny card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number,
mobile identification number, personal identification number, or
other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument
identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone
or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money,
goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to
63
initiate a transfer of funds.
If Hacker uses one of the credit cards, he will have violated 18
U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), if he "knowingly and with intent to defraud
traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any
one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value
159. Id.
160. 701 F.2d 1086, 1092(4th Cir. 1983).
161. In 1997, Carlos Salgado hacked into several companies and ISPs by using a packet
sniffer that collected user log on information. Mr. Salgado obtained a list of thousands of credit
cards and was caught when he attempted to sell them on a CD-ROM to an undercover FBI agent
at the San Francisco International Airport. He subsequently pleaded guilty to four counts: two
counts of computer crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and two counts of trafficking in stolen credit
cards under 18 U.S.C. § 1029. See Richard Power & Rik Farrow, Electronic Commerce Crime;
hzcludes Related Article on Excerpt from a Hacker's E-mail; Internet/Web/Online Service
Information, NETWORK, Dec. 1997.
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029(a)(3) (Vest Supp. 1999).
163. Id. § 1030(e)(1).
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aggregating $ 1,000 or more during that period." 164 If Hacker is found
guilty of violating § 1029(a)(2) or (3), he can be sent to prison for up
1 65
to ten years.
When Hacker edited the log fies to cover his intrusion, he
caused damage to the computer under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C),
which criminalizes the intentional damage of a computer. His
alteration of the log files resulted in reckless or negligent damage, as
provided for under § 1030(a)(5)((B)-(C)). Hacker also violated the
same subsection when he created a hidden directory and planted the
backdoor. When Hacker installed the sniffer to intercept the network
traffic, he damaged the system in violation of § 1030(a)(5)(A),
possibly violated § 1030(a)(4) if he obtained anything of value from
the "eavesdropping," and most likely violated § 1030 (a)(3)(C) by
obtaining information from a protected computer and violated the
privacy that Congress specifically intended to protect. 66
As one can see from the above hacking examples, the hacking
technique used in an attack will determine which of the subsections
are relevant for both criminal and civil actions.16 7
C. Malicious Code - Viruses, Worms, and Trojans
Malicious code is computer code that is written with the sole
intent to cause damage to a machine or to invade the machine to steal
information. The most common forms of malicious code are viruses,
worms, and Trojan programs. Some of these forms may share similar
techniques or objectives. However, there are substantial differences
between the various forms and different federal laws may apply to
each form, depending on the technical method in which the offending
code damages the victim.
1. Viruses
Viruses have become a serious financial and security threat to
computer networks across the world.16 8 According to CERT, there are
an estimated 30,000 computer viruses in existence today and there are

164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029(c)(1)(A)(i), § 1029(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
165. See id. § 1029(c)(1)(A)(i).
166. Hearings on S. 982, supra note 149.
167. Incidentally, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (vest Supp. 1999) allows a victim to maintain a
civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory or other equitable relief.
168. See The Melissa Virus: Hearing of the Technology Subcomm. of the House Science
Comm., 106 Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Melissa Virus Hearings] (statement of Michael A.
Vatis, Director, NIPC, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
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69
approximately 300 new viruses created each month.
A virus is a program than infects a computer by inserting a copy
of itself into the computer and harms the computer in some manner,
generally without the computer user's awareness.1 70 Not all viruses
cause damage to its host. Viruses that are "benign," or non-harmful,
are still considered viruses. For example, a virus could display an

innocuous message on a certain date. Although it might be annoying
and create a sense of anxiousness, the virus does not cause any
measurable harm. However, the current anti-virus and anti-hacking
statutes 7 ' do not always distinguish between harmful and benign
viruses.

172

A virus is typically spread from one computer (computer A) to
another (computer B) by e-mail or an infected disk. However, the
virus on computer B does not infect the computer until the program is
"executed." A common method of virus execution is when computer
B's user is tricked into opening a file attached to an e-mail, thinking
the file is a harmless program coming from a friendly source.
However, recent viruses, such as Bubbleboy, can infect a computer

when a user merely reads an e-mail, without opening any
attachments.

73

A virus can also be executed by hiding a "macro" routine in a

169. See id. The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Survivable Systems Initiative at
the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center at
Carnegie Mellon University. CERT was started by DARPA (the Defense Applied Research
Projects Agency, part of the U.S. Department of Defense) in December 1988 after the Morris
Worm incident crippled approximately 10% of all computers connected to the Internet.
170. See Introduction to Computer Viruses, Sophos Virus Info (May 26, 1998)
<http:lwww.sophos.comlvirusinfo/articles/virusintro.html>.
171. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1999).
172. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that a virus must cause
"damage,"or the hacker must obtain "something of value").
173. According to Symantec:
VBS.BubbleBoy is a worm that works under Windows 98 and Windows 2000.
The worm will also work under Windows 95 only if the Windows Scripting Host
is installed. The worm will only work with the English and Spanish versions of
the operating systems, and not with Windows NT. Microsoft Outlook (or
Express) with Internet Explorer 5 must be used in order for the worm to
propagate. The worm utilizes a known security hole in Microsoft Outlook/IE5 to
insert a script file, UPDATE.HTA, when the email is viewed. It is not necessary
to detach and run an attachment. UPDATE.HTA is placed in Program-StartUp of
the Start menu. Therefore, the infection routine is not executed until the next time
you start your computer.
Symantee AntiVirus Research Center, VBS.BubbleBoy (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http:/lwww.symantec.comlavcenter/venc/datalvbs.bubbleboy.html>
[hereinafter
VBS.BubbleBoy].
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common Microsoft Office product file, like Word or Excel, and the
macro can command the computer to act in harmful ways.174 Files
that contain only data, such as image files (.gif and .jpg), music files

(.wav and .mp3) and text files that do not contain macro functionality
(.txt) are not capable of transmitting a virus because they cannot
175

command the computer to perform any functions.
Once a virus is activated, it does not have to cause damage
immediately. There are countless creative ways a virus can be
triggered.176 Most viruses contain a "payload," which contains the
damaging code.177 The "payload" is the damage a virus creates.178 In
the past, virus payloads have been triggered on a certain date, 179 when
the computer re-starts,1 0 or after a certain amount of times the virus is
loaded into the system.18' Viruses can hide in several places in a

computer's memory. 82 Other viruses hide in computer programs so
that the virus is activated every time the program is loaded."" Once
the virus is activated, it can duplicate and spread itself without any
184
further input by the user.
Once a virus is loaded onto the hard drive 1 5 and "launches" its
174. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Viruses, Worms, and OtherDestructive Forces,
N.Y.U., July 13, 1999.
175. See id.
176. For example, a virus payload can be triggered to cause damage to a machine on a
certain date; by launching an infected executable file; by running a companion program; or after
the user enters a certain word in a program. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Symantec AntiVirus Research Center, W95.LoveSong.998 (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http:lwww.symantec.comlavcenter/vinfodb.html> [hereinafter W95.LoveSong.998].
180. See VBS.BubbleBoy, supra note 173.
181. Id.
182. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 174.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. A hard disk, or memory, is the main memory where programs and the operating
system are permanently stored. As an example, one can think of the hard drive as a large filing
cabinet, the random access memory (RAM) as a table, and the processor as a clerk. When the
clerk wants to work on a file, he goes to the filing cabinet and brings the file to the table, where
he can open up the file and read it. If the clerk wants to read another file, he repeats the process.
The relationship between the hard drive, RAM, and processor can be further illustrated by
adjusting the variables. If a lot more filing cabinets are added, but the size of the desk is still the
same, the clerk will not be able to increase the number of files he can put on the table. If the
size of the desk is increased, but the clerk moves slowly, then too many files on the desk may
actually slow him down. The operating system is the set of instructions that coordinate all of the
actions that take place in the computer. Although operating systems often come on CD-ROMs,
they are not "computer programs." A program can only run "on top of an operating system."
The operating system is like the translator that gets all of the hardware and software talking
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payload, the results can range from annoyingly humorous like
"W95.LoveSong.998," which causes a Korean love song to play on a
certain date'86 to total devastation like "the Emperor," which will
permanently overwrite data on the hard disk and then attempt to
destroy the Flash BIOS.'87 There is also concern that a macro virus
placed on a government computer could e-mail sensitive or classified
8
material to others without the knowledge of the computer's user.1 1
a. The Melissa Virus
The Melissa Macro Virus was launched in March, 1999 and
rapidly spread through computers across the world. The Melissa
Macro Virus was a virus that was hidden in a Microsoft Word
attachment that appeared to come from a person known to the
recipient. When the attachment was opened, a list of pornographic
web site passwords were displayed. However, unknown to the user,
the program also activated a macro that read the first fifty e-mail
addresses located in the Microsoft Outlook e-mail program and emailed itself to the fifty addresses with the message subject header
"Important Message from (the name of someone on the list)."' 89 The
virus was estimated to have caused $80 million in damages and
spread so quickly that within 48 hours, Microsoft and Intel were
forced to shut down their servers.1 90 One company reported that its
"500-employee computer network was buffeted by 32,000 e-mail
messages in a 45 minute period, effectively shutting it down for

together. In the above example, the operating system is like the employee handbook that tells
the clerk what he is supposed to do and how he is supposed to do it. Many viruses hide in the
boot sector area of the hard disk that the operating system checks when it begins to load the
operating system.
186. See W95.LoveSong.998, supranote 179.
187. See Symantec Antivirus Research Center, Emperor (visited Apr. 9, 2000)
<http:llwww.symantec.comlavcenter/venc/data/emperor.html> [hereinafter Emperor].
A computer's basic input-output system (BIOS) is typically a read-only memory
(ROM) that is programmed at the time it is manufactured with particular lowlevel code responsible for basic boot functions and managing persistent data such
as the date and time. Most recent PCs have been manufactured with a relatively
new type of memory called Flash ROM. BIOS in Flash ROM is often referred to
as Flash BIOS. Flash BIOS capability means that enhancements can be installed
using a special program without having to physically replace a chip.
Mitre (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.mitre.org/research/cots/FLASHBIOS.html>.
188. See Melissa Virus Hearings, supra note 168 (statement of Michael Vatis, Director,
NIPC, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
189. Raysman & Brown, supra note 174.
190. See ZDTV Exclusive: Accused Author of Melissa Computer Virus to Plead Guilty in
Court Tomorrow, PR NEWSWNIRE, Dec. 8, 1999.
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legitimate purposes."'191
The author of the virus, David Smith, was quickly caught and
pled guilty to state' 92 and federal charges. Mr. Smith pled guilty to
intentionally causing damage to computers, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2),
(5)(A), with an admission that he was responsible for the $80 million
in damages that affected over a million computers.' 9' The Melissa
Macro Virus resulted in the first successful prosecution of a virus
writer in over a decade 94 and only the second successful prosecution
in history, 195 despite the fact that viruses continue to plague the
96
Internet. 1
Applicable Federal Criminal Statutes:
The relevant and tested federal anti-virus statutes are 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). If a virus is loaded into
a computer by an e-mail attachment, and the author intended to cause
"damage" to the recipient computer, then 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)
is applicable.
Section 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits the knowing
transmission of a program, code, or command, that results in
intentional damage without authorization to a protected computer.
If the virus author did not intend to cause damage to the
computer, but rather the code accidentally damaged the computer as a
result of the e-mail transmission, then as an alternative to the above
statute, the author may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(B) which covers reckless damage to a computer as a
result of unauthorized and intentional access. The penalties for both
§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and (B) are the same-up to five years in prison. A
negligence standard would be considered too low for an intentional
act, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C), which is a
misdemeanor.
If the recipient of the virus forwards the virus on to another

191. Melissa Virus Hearings,supra note 168.
192. Mr. Smith plead guilty to second-degree computer theft under NJ.S.A. 2C:20-25. See
CyberattackInvestigation, supranote 25.
193. CyberattackInvestigation,supra note 25.
194. Denialof Service Attacks, supra note 97.
195. See id.
196. One of the most common viruses in 1999 and 2000 is another Microsoft Word Macro
virus called WM97/Marker.
See Sophos Virus Info (visited Mar. 14, 2000)
<http:llwww.sophos.comlvirusinfoltoptenl>. This virus sends a message to an Internet site
containing the File Information Summary whenever the window is closed. See id. Although
this information may not be highly sensitive, it could only be the beginning of significant
invasions of privacy on the Internet by viruses.
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person via e-mail, then his mental state, or mens rea, will determine
his culpability. 91 7 If he is unaware that there is a virus, then he will not
have the requisite mental state.1 98 If he is aware that there is a virus,
then he could face § 1030(a)(5)(A) liability because he intentionally
sent the virus.'99 However, if he was aware there was a virus attached
to the e-mail, but he thought it was a harmless prank, for example,
then his act could be reckless or negligent; mental states that can
trigger § 1030(a)(5) sanctions.
There is a possibility that a virus may not reach federal
jurisdiction if the virus was transmitted to a stand-alone computer by
diskette. Section 1030(a)(5) covers only "protected computers," those
that are "used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication. '' 2°°
If the computer has a modem or a fax server loaded on it, then the
prosecution could argue that it is a protected computer because it is a
computer "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication." 20' However, if the virus is loaded onto a nonnetworked computer that, for example, is used in a small office for
billing and the virus is placed on it by a diskette, a strong argument
can be made that it is not a protected computer under federal
jurisdiction because it is not a computer "which is used in interstate or
'202
foreign commerce or communication.
However, if the virus is loaded onto a computer and causes any
of the enumerated damages in § 1030(e)(8), then action against the
attacker might be brought under the statute. For example, if the virus
was loaded onto a computer that was used to store medical records,
and if the virus impaired the treatment or care of an individual
because the patient's medical records were destroyed, then it would
trigger criminal liability even though the damage did not meet the
monetary threshold.2 3 Of course, there are state anti-virus laws which
would bring the attack under state jurisdiction if federal jurisdiction is
unavailable. However, a discussion of state statutes are beyond the
scope of this article.
Section 1030(a)(2) has been successfully used against viruses
that have invaded the system and sent information from the
197, See Haeji Hong, Hacking Through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 283,296 (1997).
198. See id.
199, See id.
200, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
201. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(A).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(8).
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computer. 204 Section 1030(a)(2)(C) criminalizes the intentional access
of a computer without, or in excess of authorization, to obtain
information from any protected computer if the conduct involved
interstate or foreign commerce. In this case, it is irrelevant if the
virus was loaded into the computer by a diskette because the emailing of the information, such as Melissa's fifty e-mail contacts,
invokes federal jurisdicqtion because it involves interstate and foreign
commerce.
Finally, if the e-mail attachments made their way to a Federal
Government computer or a computer that "is used by or for the
Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by
or for the Government of the United States," then the sender of the
20 5
virus could be liable for a misdemeanor under § 1030(a)(3).
If a Melissa Macro-type virus were to infect a Government
computer, then the virus sender could be liable under § 1030(a)(2)(B),
which prohibits the intentional access of a computer and obtaining
information from the Federal Government. The e-mail addresses in
Microsoft Outlook could be considered "information." However, if
any information that is considered protected against unauthorized
disclosure "for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any
restricted data," then the virus sender could be liable under
§ 1030(a)'s most serious violation-§ 1030(a)(1). This subsection
provides for a prison term up to ten years.
2. Worms
Worms are similar to viruses. However, one major distinction is
that worms multiply without any human interaction. A worm can
wind its way through a network system without the need to be
attached to a file, unlike viruses. 20 6
The Haiku worm is a good example of a robust worm with many
features. The Haiku worm spreads itself through e-mail with an
attachment called "haiku.exe." When the worm is executed, it
modifies the system to load every time the computer is re-booted.
After the computer is re-booted, a small haiku poem will appear in a
window box. The worm generates it own haikus from a list of words.
The worm will also search the hard drive for e-mail addresses and the
worm will send haiku.exe with a message to the e-mail addressees it
204. See Wendy Davis, ProsecutorsWatching the Web Street Crime is Down, but that may
Just Mean it's Moving Online, 158 NJ. LJ. 933 (1999).
205. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(8) (West Supp. 1999).
206. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 174.
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located on the hard drive.20 7
annoying, it is not malicious.

However, although the worm is

a. The Morris Worm
Robert Morris was a first-year graduate student in Cornell
University's computer science Ph.D. program when he released a
computer worm with the intent to demonstrate the vulnerability of
computers to malicious programs. He programmed the worm to
multiply only once on a computer, thereby helping the worm evade
detection. However, to defeat system administrators who might trick
the worm into thinking the computer already had the worm, Morris
designed the worm to automatically reproduce every seventh time,
regardless of whether the machine already had the worm. However,
Morris underestimated the number of iterations the worm would
make. The worm multiplied across the Internet much more quickly
than anticipated and he made attempts to limit the damage by
releasing a solution over the Internet. However, due to network
congestion caused by the worm, the solution was not able to get
through until serious damage had already been done to many
protected computers across the country. The estimated cost to repair
each infected installation ranged from $200 to more than $53,000.
Morris was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). The
trial court convicted Morris and the Second Circuit upheld the
conviction on grounds that § 1030(a)(5)(A) "does not require the
Government to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally prevented
authorized use and thereby caused loss."208 In 1996, Congress
codified the Morris court's holding by specifying the levels of mens
rea required for three subsections of § 1030(a)(5), two felony and one
misdemeanor.
Applicable Federal Criminal Laws:
As some worms multiply exponentially and wind their way
through the Internet, they can cause extensive damage in overloaded
servers and anti-worm extraction. If a company has 500 computers
on a network that become infected, the cost to extract the worms
would easily meet the $5,000 threshold for damages. As Congress

207. Symantec AntiVirus Research Center, W95.Haiku.16384.Worm (visited Apr. 6, 2000)
<http:llwww.symantec.comlregionluklaveenter/venc/w95_haiku_16384-worm.html>
[hereinafter 95.Haiku.16384.Worm].
208. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504,505 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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learned after the Morris case, the intent to access, 209 not the intent to
damage, has to be the standard as the world becomes more interconnected.2 1 0
If a worm is received by a user and executed and installed in the
system, § 1030(a)(5)(C) would cover the knowing transmission of
that program if it caused an aggregate $5,000 in damage. Sections
1030(a)(5)(B)-(C) may not be available because of the non-targeted
nature of worms. Those subsections proscribe the "intentional
access" of protected computers and a worm is indiscriminately sent
out, at least after the first wave. Likewise, nothing of value is taken21 '
and no information is obtained, 2 2 so the other subsections will not be
relevant in a standard self-replicating worm program.
3. Trojan Horse Programs
A Trojan Horse program, or Trojan program, is an innocentlooking program that contains hidden functions. They are loaded
onto the computer's hard drive and executed along with the regular
program. However, hidden in the belly of the "innocent" program is a
sub-program that will perform a function, mostly unknown to the
user. Trojan programs can take the form of a popular program where
the original source code has been altered to hide the Trojan
"payload."
a. Back Orifice 2000
Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K) is a Trojan program that is designed
for misuse and attack on another computer. It is an advanced
program that takes a group of complex hacking and networking
activities and bundles them into one graphical interface. The hacker
has the victim install the "server" on his computer without his
knowledge, typically in the form of an e-mail attachment. After the
victim has loaded the BO2K on his machine, the hacker is able to
gather information on the victim's computer, perform system
commands, redirect network traffic and reconfigure the victim's
computer. The damage that a hacker can do to a computer is
limitless, and the invasion of privacy could cause serious damage to
companies and individuals. BO2K invisibly resides on the remote
209. The estimated cost of dealing with the worm at each installation ranged from $200 to
more than $53,000. See id. at 506.
210. See Hatcher et al., supranote 1, at 406-07.

211.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (West Supp. 1999).

212.

See id. at (1)-(3).
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victim's computer and can perform unauthorized actions without the
user's knowledge. If the victim is on a network, the hacker could
21 3
gain broad access to that network.
The installation of BO2K involves installing the client on the
hacker's computer and getting the victim to install the server on his
machine. Once BO2K has been properly configured, the server
sitting on the victim's computer silently waits for instructions from
the hacker's client. BO2K has over seventy commands that it can
send from the hacker's client to the server. The hacker simply has to
scroll down a list of commands, click on the command he wants to
initiate on the remote server, and push the "Send Command" button.
The server's response will appear in a window below the command
list.24

The solution to these Trojan programs is to avoid opening e-

mail attachments, particularly from non-trusted sources. In addition,
all of the major anti-virus detection kits can locate BO2K software on
computers.
Applicable Federal Criminal Laws:
Trojan programs are specifically the type of computer crimes
§ 1030(a) was meant to address because the likelihood of malicious
damage that can cause millions of dollars in damages is very high. As
the economy becomes more inter-networked, the risks posed by
programs such as BO2K are increasing.
Like virus distribution, if the Trojan program writer gives a
program on a diskette to someone who installs the program on a
stand-alone computer, and the computer is damaged, there may not be
adequate Federal jurisdiction in this scenario. The computer may not
be considered a "protected computer" that is "used in interstate or
213. BO2K can be analogized to receiving a package that contains a hidden microphone.
214. The following are examples of BO2K Commands: System commands, including the
ability to shut down and reboot the remote computer, freeze up the remote computer and retrieve
a list of the user names and passwords located on the machine; Key Logging commands enable
the hacker to send each keystroke the victim makes to a text file on the victim's computer,
where he can later retrieve the keystroke log file with the click of a button. Keyloggers are the
most pernicious of privacy invasions because the keystroke logger saves every key pressed on
the keyboard, eliminating the possibility of erasing your thoughts or later encrypting them
because the hacker has access to every letter you typed before you erased the documents or
encrypted it; MS Networking commands allows the hacker to access other computers on a local
network; Registry commands enables the hacker to edit the computer's registry, the virtual
"guts" of the computer system; Multimedia Commands permits the hacker to capture video
stills and play .wav files located on the remote computer; File/Directory commands provide the
hacker with the ability to view the directory list, and find, view, copy and delete files.
Obviously, this type of silent access on a computer is a severe invasion of privacy. See BO2K
Does (visited Apr. 7,2000) <http:lwww.bo2k.comldocs/Cmdrefindexbar.html>.
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foreign commerce or communication. 2 15
If the Trojan program writer e-mails a program that a recipient
surreptitiously loads onto a computer, and the "payload" is harmless,
it may be difficult to establish "damage" under § 1030(a)(4) or
§ 1030(a)(5). According to § 1030(e)(8), "damage" is defined as any
"impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a
system or information that (A) causes a loss aggregating at least
$5,000 in value during any 1-year period or one or more
' 16
individuals. 2
If the Trojan program writer e-mails a program that a recipient
surreptitiously loads onto a computer, and the "payload" does cause
damage, and if the "damage" definition in § 1030(e)(8) can be met,
then the program author would at least be liable under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), which prohibits the knowing transmission of a
program, information, code, or command that intentionally causes
damage.
If the Trojan program makes its way onto several
computers, the damage calculation could be met more easily due to
§ 1030(e)(8)'s damage definition that includes "one or more
1 17
individuals. 2
If the Trojan program writer e-mails a program that a recipient
surreptitiously loads onto a computer, and the Trojan program is a
program similar to Back Orifice that transmits information from the
victim's computer to another computer, then there are several statutes
that could apply to the Trojan writer's actions, depending on the
computer that was infected.
If the computer infected by a B02K-type Trojan was a private
person or company, then the hacker would be liable under
§ 1030(a)(2), which prohibits obtaining information from the
intentional unauthorized access of a protected computer. Here, there
is no damage threshold. However, this crime is presently only a
misdemeanor, unless the value of the information exceeds $5,000 or it
was committed in the furtherance of another crime, in which case it is
bumped up to a felony.
Under the same scenario, the hacker would also be liable under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), which prohibits the knowing transmission of a
program or command that intentionally causes damage to a protected
computer. Once again, the damage threshold is an aggregate $5,000
in any one year period to one or more individuals. If this burden can
215.
216.
217.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
Id. § 1030(e)(8).
Id.
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be met, then the hacker is subject to up to five years in prison.
Theoretically, under this scenario, the Trojan program writer
could be liable under § 1030(a)(4). That subsection covers the
knowing intent to defraud a protected computer and the procurement
of anything of value in excess of $5,000. This is a felony crime.
Nonetheless, Congress did not want to make a felony out of every
hacker that breaks into a computer and uses its processing power, for
218
example, and does not obtain anything of value.
The hacker could be liable under the more serious § 1030(a)(1)
and subject to ten years in prison if the hacker's BO2K Trojan ends
up on any computer containing information that is protected by a
national statute, or restricted data that could be considered to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation. The delivery element is met because even if the information
is not transferred to the hacker's client computer, there is a provision
in the subsection for an attempted transmission.
IV. NEW COMPUTER CRIME LEGISLATION

Senators Charles Schumer and Jon Kyl have introduced new
legislation, S. 2092, aimed at addressing some of the perceived
weaknesses in the CFAA. The three main provisions addressed by
this new legislation propose the following: trap and trace orders,
21 9
federal jurisdiction requirements, and sentencing.
First, the new legislation would make it easier for cyberinvestigators to obtain "trap and trace" orders. 'Trap and trace"
devices are used to capture incoming IP packets to identify the
packet's origins. Due to the ease with which hackers are able to
"spoof' their true origin, the most effective way to reconstruct the
path of a virus, DoS, or hacking assault is to follow a chain of
trapping devices that logged the original malicious packets as they
arrive at each individual router or server. In the case of a single
telephone company, it has been relatively easy for investigators to
obtain trap and trace orders. 220 According to Congresswoman Scott of
Virginia, "one communication is being carried by several different
[ISPs], by a telephone company or two, local or long distance, by a
cell company or two, and soon enough by a satellite company or
two. '22' Once the segment of the route goes beyond the court's
218. See Hatcher et al.,
supra note 1, at 407.
219.
220.

See Trap and Trace, supranote 89.
See id.

221.

Id.
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jurisdiction, investigators must then go to the next jurisdiction and file
a request for a trap and trace order for the next segment. The new
legislation would authorize the issuance of a single order to
22
completely trace an on-line communication from start to finish.
The second provision would lower the monetary barrier for
Currently, the CFAA requires a damage
federal jurisdiction.
threshold in excess of $5,000.223 However, the $5,000 threshold is
often difficult to establish when there is no fixed monetary value to
the information. Also, investigators must currently wait for a damage
assessment before they can initiate an investigation, which can cause
The new legislation would permit federal
expensive delays.
jurisdiction at the outset of an attack. Crimes that exceed $5,000 will
still be treated as felonies. 224 However, attacks that cause less than
$5,000 in damage would be defined as misdemeanors. Finally, the
legislation clarifies what is included in the calculation of "damage,"
making it easy to reach the $5,000 threshold.225 It provides for the
costs of responding to the offense, the damage assessment costs,
restoration costs, and any lost revenue or costs incurred from the
226
interruption of service.
The third provision would modify the strict sentence directives
contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1999 which required a mandatory incarceration for a minimum of six
months for any violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).227 Some hacking
crimes have gone unprosecuted because the six month sentence was
considered excessive. The new legislation would provide lesser
sentences for lesser crimes, helping to ensure that all levels of hacking
228
cases will be prosecuted.
Finally, the proposed legislation would make juvenile
perpetrators fifteen years of age and older eligible for federal
prosecution in serious computer crime cases at the Attorney General's
229
discretion.
However, the proposed changes have raised privacy concerns. A
report written by the President's Working Group on Unlawful
Conduct on the Internet entitled "The Electronic Frontier: the
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
S. 2092IS, 106th Cong. §2 (2000).
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
S. 2092 IS, 106th Cong. §2 (2000).
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Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet" has
raised the concerns of privacy advocates. 2 0
The groups are
particularly concerned about the potential for trap and trace abuse by
authorities. 23' The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), would
like to raise the standards for trap and trace devices, rather than lower
them. 23 2 According to the ACLU, law enforcement currently only
needs to overcome "minimum obstacles" to obtain trap and trace
devices.23 3 The ACLU is concerned that an expansion of the
government's power to obtain trap and trace orders will enhance the
government's power to "surreptitiously intercept even more personal
electronic communications. '23 4 The current standard for a trap and
trace order is that the investigator must assert in writing to the court
that the information is "relevant" to an ongoing investigation. 23 5
According to the ACLU, the "judge to whom the application is made
must approve the application, even ifhe disagrees with the assertions
23 6
of law enforcement.
Additionally, the ACLU is concerned that an expansion of the
substance of the orders will erode privacy. The ACLU speculates that
an expansion of the powers "might allow law enforcement agents to
access a variety of data, including dial-up numbers, IP addresses,
electronic mail logs, uploaded files, and so on.... without a court
order."

237

The CFAA is broad enough to cover most computer crimes. The
Act protects government and private computers against inside and
outside threats to information, fraud, and damage. Continued proactive legislative changes to keep the Act up to date in the escalating
cyber-war between secure web sites and hackers will be critical to
maintaining the integrity of our increasingly inter-networked society.
One challenge in the near future will be the expansion of the number
of devices that are able to access the Internet. For example, as
televisions become "web-enabled," allowing users to access the

230. Robyn E. Bumner, Government Wants to Bore Web Peephole, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at 4D.
231. See, e.g., letter from Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director, ACLU, to Janet Reno,
Attorney General of the United States (Mar. 8, 2000) (on file with the Santa Clara Computer
and High Technology Law Journal).
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Letter from Barry Steinhardt, supra note 231.
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Internet from their televisions, will televisions be considered "highspeed data processing devices" as defined under the Act's "computer"
definition? Would passwords taken from the television's cookie
storage be protected under the Act? As Wireless Application Protocol
(WAP) brings the Internet to hand-held devices and mobile
telephones, will the devices and telephones be considered "protected
computers"?
Cyber-crime prosecutors are also facing the difficulty of attacks
that originate overseas beyond their jurisdiction. If part of a hacking
trail is routed overseas, unless the U.S has an agreement with the
foreign jurisdiction, that trail could lead to a dead end if investigators
do not have access to the server's logs. The world of individual
national jurisdictions will need to address the increasingly borderless
crimes committed in cyberspace. However, the CFAA provides a
solid foundation upon which we can develop new cyber-crime laws
for the coming century.
V. CONCLUSION

Over the course of the past ten years, cyber-crimes have
progressed from being malicious pranks by disenchanted teenagers to
a serious threat that will tax the resources of crime enforcement and
potentially destabilize society. Successful criminal prosecution and
civil litigation will require that members of the legal community
familiarize themselves with the various hacking techniques to ensure
that the perpetrators are tried and convicted under the relevant
statutes. A misapplication of the law to a specific hacking technique
could allow a hacker to walk free. Likewise, members of the business
community must understand the serious risks associated with
conducting business on-line and their responsibility to the other
companies for negligent maintenance of their systems.
And finally, hackers who naively believe in their right to access
information, must be made aware that even harmless computer
intrusions can trigger criminal sanctions. The financial stakes have
risen dramatically over the past five years. Until there are more high
profile hacking prosecutions, naive hackers will continue to believe
that they are invulnerable and their hacks are a form of innocent
digital thrill seeking. Nevertheless, over the next few years, there will
be a few hackers whose only hacking and cracking is going to be
breaking rocks on a chain gang.
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APPENDIX A
The following definitions are taken from the Jargon Dictionary:
The Jargon File, version 4.2.0, available on-line at
<http://www.netmeg.net/jargon/>.
cracker n. One who breaks security on a system. Coined ca.
1985 by hackers in defense against journalistic misuse of hacker [].
An earlier attempt to establish 'worm' in this sense around 1981-82
on Usenet was largely a failure.
Use of both these neologisms reflects a strong revulsion against
the theft and vandalism perpetrated by cracking rings. While it is
expected that any real hacker will have done some playful cracking
and knows many of the basic techniques, anyone past larval stage is
expected to have outgrown the desire to do so except for immediate,
benign, practical reasons (for example, if it's necessary to get around
some security in order to get some work done).
Thus, there is far less overlap between hackerdom and
crackerdom than the mundane reader misled by sensationalistic
journalism might expect. Crackers tend to gather in small, tight-knit,
very secretive groups that have little overlap with the huge, open
poly-culture this lexicon describes; though crackers often like to
describe themselves as hackers, most true hackers consider them a
separate and lower form of life.
Ethical considerations aside, hackers figure that anyone who
can't imagine a more interesting way to play with their computers
than breaking into someone else's has to be pretty losing [sic].
daemon /day'mn/ or /dee'mn/ n. [from the mythological
meaning, later rationalized as the acronym 'Disk And Execution
MONitor'] A program that is not invoked explicitly, but lies dormant
waiting for some condition(s) to occur. The idea is that the
perpetrator of the condition need not be aware that a daemon is
lurking (though often a program will commit an action only because it
knows that it will implicitly invoke a daemon). For example, under
ITS writing a file on the LPT spooler's directory would invoke the
spooling daemon, which would then print the file. The advantage is
that programs wanting (in this example) files printed need neither
compete for access to nor understand any idiosyncrasies of the LPT.
They simply enter their implicit requests and let the daemon decide
what to do with them. Daemons are usually spawned automatically
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by the system, and may either live forever or be regenerated at
intervals.
Daemon and demon are often used interchangeably, but seem to
have distinct connotations. The term 'daemon' was introduced to
computing by CTSS people (who pronounced it /dee'mon/) and used
it to refer to what ITS called a dragon; the prototype was a program
called DAEMON that automatically made tape backups of the file
system. Although the meaning and the pronunciation have drifted, we
think this glossary reflects current (2000) usage.
FTP /F-T-P/, not Ifit'ip/ 1. [techspeak] n. The File Transfer
Protocol for transmitting files between systems on the Internet. 2. vt.
To beam a file using the File Transfer Protocol. 3. Sometimes used as
a generic even for file transfers not using FTP. "Lemme get a copy of
"Wuthering Heights" ftp'd from uunet."
hacker n. [originally, someone who makes furniture with an
axe] 1. A person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable
systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most
users, who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary. 2. One who
programs enthusiastically (even obsessively) or who enjoys
programming rather than just theorizing about programming. 3. A
person capable of appreciating hack value, which is defined as the
reason or motivation for expending effort toward a seemingly useless
goal, the point being that the accomplished goal is a hack. 4. A
person who is good at programming quickly. 5. An expert at a
particular program, or one who frequently does work using it or on it;
as in 'a Unix hacker'. (Definitions 1 through 5 are correlated, and
people who fit them congregate.) 6. An expert or enthusiast of any
kind. One might be an astronomy hacker, for example. 7. One who
enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming or
circumventing limitations. 8. [deprecated] A malicious meddler who
tries to discover sensitive information by poking around. Hence
'password hacker', 'network hacker'. The correct term for this sense
is cracker....
root n. [Unix] 1. The "superuser" account (with user name
'root') that ignores permission bits, user number 0 on a Unix system.
The term avatar is also used. 2. The top node of the system directory
structure; historically the home directory of the root user, but
probably named after the root of an (inverted) tree. 3. By extension,
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the privileged system-maintenance login on any OS....
server n. A kind of daemon that performs a service for the
requester and which often runs on a computer other than the one on
which the server runs. A particularly common term on the Internet,
which is rife with 'web servers,' 'name servers,' 'domain servers,'
'news servers,' 'finger servers,' and the like.
shell [orig.Multics n. techspeak, widely propagated via Unix] 1.
[techspeak] The command interpreter used to pass commands to an
operating system; so called because it is the part of the operating
system that interfaces with the outside world. 2. More generally, any
interface program that mediates access to a special resource or server
for convenience, efficiency, or security reasons; for this meaning, the
usage is usually 'a shell around' whatever. This sort of program is
also called a 'wrapper.' ...
TCP/IP /T'C-P I'P/ n. 1.
[Transmission Control
ProtocoL/Interet Protocol] The wide-area-networking protocol that
makes the Internet work, and the only one most hackers can speak the
name of without laughing or retching. Unlike such allegedly
'standard' competitors such as X.25, DECnet, and the ISO 7-layer
stack, TCP/IP evolved primarily by actually being used, rather than
being handed down from on high by a vendor or a heavily-politicized
standards committee.
Consequently, it (a) works, (b) actually
promotes cheap cross-platform connectivity, and (c) annoys the hell
out of corporate and governmental empire-builders everywhere.
Hackers value all three of these properties....
TELNET Itel'net! vt. (also commonly lowercased as 'telnet') To
communicate with another Internet host using the TELNET [
protocol (usually using a program of the same name). TOPS-10
people used the word IMPCOM, since that was the program name for
them. Sometimes abbreviated to TN IT-NI. "I usually TN over to
SAIL just to read the AP News."

